Revolutions in Military Affairs: From the Sea

by Commander James J. Tritten, US Navy, Retired

Many have described contemporary revolutions in military affairs (RMA) but base their models primarily on the experiences of ground forces and armies. Because of additional examples from the sea services, we need a new RMA theory. But whatever the context, we must be wary of claiming that technology redefines RMA in relation to doctrine.

An RMA is a fundamental shift in military strategy, doctrine and tactics that most often occurs because of a technological change. As an RMA occurs, it influences the need to reconsider all existing military theory and any necessary transition to a new warfare process. Industry or the research community often present new technological opportunities to the military, which then considers developing new capabilities and supporting doctrine. With some technological opportunities warfare's nature and theory shift, requiring new strategy, doctrine and tactics.

Navy RMA

A clear-cut example of a traditional RMA caused by technology was the introduction of naval artillery during the age of sail. Naval artillery changed the fundamental nature of war at sea from ramming, boarding and hand-to-hand fighting to standoff destruction by shipboard artillery. During the Spanish Armada's defeat in 1588, the Spanish combat concept focused on boarding enemy ships in a general melee. The English kept their distance using long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the Armada.

As new forms of specialized warships with cannon appeared, merchantmen went back to hauling cargo. Eventually navies learned how to mass firepower in the maritime battlespace and introduced the line of battle—similar to lines of battle ashore.

An RMA also causes changes in military organization. As mariners mastered the RMA that added artillery, navies assumed other missions. National fleets soon reorganized under centralized command and control. Parts of fleets remained dedicated to supporting ground forces' maritime flanks. Other naval forces became distant water-expeditionary forces. Some navy units interdicted sea lines of communications (SLOC); others protected SLOC. Main battle fleets dealt with enemy forces.

The revolution in sea-based artillery required professional navies to master its potential, and privateers soon disappeared. The end of privateering and using commercial ships in fights caused a major naval-warfare paradigm shift. However, the shift to distant battle did not occur overnight. Artillery was considered a complement to boarding and hand-to-hand combat. Eventually ramming also died out, although it resurfaced for a short time following its success at the 1866 Battle of Lissa.

Lack of Maritime Parallels

Rifles and machineguns contributed to shore-based RMAs. Ground warfare lines of battle were replaced by the infantry skirmish and maneuver warfare. New ground-force weaponry increased combat's spatial and temporal scope, requiring better logistic support and planning. At sea, the introduction of rifled artillery and armor—coupled with steam propulsion, the screw propeller and modern communications systems—contributed to new combat uses for the fleet. But, they did not constitute an RMA in the purest sense.

Newly designed ships with rifled artillery, such as HMS *Dreadnought*, made entire national fleets obsolete. Armor countered the new shells, and a duel ensued between the offense and the defense. Fleet units under steam instead of sail, aided by radio, could rapidly mass for decisive engagements, maneuvering where they wanted rather than where the winds took them. Despite the infusion of technology, navies were still about "slugging it out" with an enemy line of battle in artillery duels. For every RMA ashore, there is not necessarily a parallel one at sea.

Second Modern Navy

The marriage of airplanes, tanks and mobile artillery gave rise to another shore-based RMA. The *blitzkrieg*, a form of maneuver warfare that doomed positional warfare, positing the theory that rapid annihilation could be practiced ashore. By World War II's end, allied military forces were engaged in simultaneous strategic-level combat actions in all theaters of war. The 1945 Soviet Manchurian Operation was perhaps the finest example of this form of warfare.

A rough maritime parallel to the *blitzkrieg* was the World War II advent in the Pacific of the fast carrier task force and its accompanying logistic train. Such forces roamed the oceans, searching for enemy battle fleets, which could be engaged by aircraft at vast distances from the attacker's fleet. Alternatively, naval task groups were formed to penetrate enemy shore defenses, bypassing strongpoints in their own form of maneuver warfare.

These new forms of warfare were not fully accepted by old-line navy officers; "slugging it out" with the battleline and surface ships finally died at Surigao Straits during the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf. Naval artillery yielded to the ascendant airplane and missile. Naval warfare had finally changed to a more complex form of combined arms warfare.

Problems with the Existing Model

Detailed examination of historical RMA ashore suggests that the technology-leading RMA model is inadequate. Often, new technology is not immediately recognized as

causing an RMA or as needing new doctrine or organization. The failure of medieval mounted knights and ground-slogging infantry to adapt to firearms is, perhaps, a classic example.[1] Firearm use by both knights and infantry did not immediately cause major changes in the fundamental nature of medieval warfare. Four centuries passed before firearms had improved enough to create a true RMA.[2]

As medieval foot soldiers gradually lost their ability to fight as cohesive units, they were upstaged by mounted soldiers. The Swiss Confederation discovered that infantry could counter mounted soldiers by improving tactical formations *alone*. Infantry squares, resembling the old Macedonian phalanx, armed with an equally old technology, long pikes or spears, permitted foot soldiers to withstand the charge of mounted horsemen, attack with hand weapons, unseat the knight and defeat him as he lay relatively helpless on the ground. These changes in tactical doctrine eclipsed the knight, although folklore persists in crediting firearms with the knights' demise.

At sea, the shift from naval artillery to combined arms maneuver warfare took relatively few decades. Navies first tried using new technologies to improve existing concepts. Early in World War II, the fast carrier striking force's development as a mobile reconnaissance strike complex resulted from prewar planning, technological opportunities and experience.

The subsequent shift to nuclear warfighting was an RMA introduced by new technology. Although nuclear warfighting at sea was embraced in the form of long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles aimed at shore targets, world navies never fully adopted it as a new model of combat. They never subordinated their campaign and operations planning to the same type of nuclear combat routine as did the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command.

An underlying assumption about RMAs is that nations will always capitalize on new technologies. Hence, before a new technology "genie" gets out of the bottle in some potential enemy nation, there needs to be a countervailing technology. Similar logic suggested that when faced with a potential RMA, nations would strike first before a competitor gained a decisive advantage. A more detailed study of technological opportunities indicates a far different model of national behavior.

By the mid-1930s, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) recognized that, despite all the technological and industrial efforts to upgrade the fleet, its projected capabilities would not produce a force equal to the rapidly improving US Navy. The IJN developed night tactics and eventually formed specialized night combat groups intended to weaken the US Pacific Fleet by forcing night battles before subsequent daylight battles. This tactic strained the defenders' nerves, stamina and reserve.[3]

Thus, a technological threat was met with a doctrinal, *not* technological, solution that theoretically negated new technologies. Until the US Pacific Fleet mastered radar, the IJN's exceptionally well-fought night attacks frequently bettered the US Navy.

Many nations, like Sweden, have done nothing to meet the challenge of a nuclear-armed and aggressively posturing neighbor. Others have sought refuge in alliances with nuclear-power states. Some nations use arms control to prevent the spread of technologies that might alter combat's fundamental nature.

There are also RMA examples that are not based on new technologies. Napoleon Bonaparte caused a major paradigm shift in ground warfare when he successfully mobilized citizens to fight for ideas, not money. During World War II, armies using mass caused a shift in the basic object of warfare ashore from seizing territory to defeating the enemy. Because entire nations had mobilized for war, the US considered the enemy's economic base a legitimate military target.

Did technology play any role in causing this major paradigm shift in warfare—the shift to consider the entire nation as being at war? Modern industrial capability certainly was required for such an effort. Did technology merely react to a new vision for warfare? Clearly, technology allowed for attacking the full breadth and depth of an enemy nation.

Military Doctrine and RMA

Since the early part of the 19th century, technology and the frequency and participants of war have profoundly affected the nature of Navy doctrine. Since the ironclad was introduced, technology has changed so fast and so often that navies have had little time to deal with doctrinal issues. Early on, warship designs advanced faster than navy doctrine could be reevaluated and rewritten, forcing the Navy to concentrate more on improvements to naval art and combat potential than on how to fight "smarter."

The basic model of an RMA, with technology in the leading role, is incomplete. RMAs are also stimulated by doctrinal development, which can create a "vortex" or begin a new cycle, during which doctrine pulls on the future development of technology. Advances in technology would subsequently result in alterations to organization and doctrine. In such an alternative case, military leaders would first outline a vision, concept or doctrine, then refine the vision in terms of capabilities desired, culminating in a concept-based requirements system. Industry's role under this approach would be to respond to visions, concepts and doctrinal development.

To use visions, we must also have a theory for how large bureaucratic organizations translate them into actual change. Our theory should draw from the excellent work being done at business schools in their investigations of "learning organizations" and the special skills required of leaders in such organizations.[4]

An excellent example of how military doctrine can lead technology is that of Japan during the interwar years. The IJN's doctrine for deep ocean battles was part of the vision for a short war of annihilation. The IJN generally insisted on technological superiority in each individual weapon system produced. This resulted in a search for new technological opportunities to carry out the preferred vision. As a result of doctrine's leading role, the IJN fielded the Yamato class super battleship and the Mitsubishi Zero fighter—two examples of good doc-

trine leading to excellent warfare technology. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recently issued TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, which posits the use of doctrine to shape the ongoing RMA with a visionary statement of the future battlespace.[5]

The basic RMA model is flawed in its fundamental assumption that doctrine depends on technology as its major input or output. The Napoleonic RMA was probably more a product of political, social and economic conditions than any specific military technology. Understanding how doctrine influences RMA requires a look at other factors that can impact doctrine.

Future RMAs

New technologies often have been introduced for which there is no accepted military doctrine. Improvements to combat potential increasingly are seen as the result of effective programming skills rather than skills in assessing warfighting doctrine. Today's military needs to shift focus to other, less-expensive ways of improving combat potential than concentrating on new technologies. The continued search for "silver bullets" in new technology distracts us from perfectly good solutions. Leaders would more likely rather have time to train and learn how to use the last gadget before they receive the next!

"Learning organizations are those where the individuals within . . . continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free and where people are continually learning how to learn together."[6] Learning organizations also have a shared vision of the future, which is one of the five cornerstones necessary for such organizations.

During World War II, the German Army was a learning organization when it assessed recent combat experience, then made ongoing changes to its combat doctrine. The US Navy also learned from its combat experiences and changed its doctrine.[7]

Whether the US military is experiencing a current or ongoing RMA can be debated. However, what is known is that future RMAs will occur, and we will need to manage changes, create processes and restructure organizations to deal with them. We must change military doctrine commands and training centers into learning organizations that share a vision of the future. Leaders in such organizations must be process designers, stewards of the vision and teachers who foster learning. "The new type of leader is charged with building an organization . . . where people continually expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision and improve shared mental models.[8]

Whatever the new paradigm, the US military must not overlook doctrine's leading role in stimulating technological development. Doctrinal development in support of paradigm shifts and RMAs must first communicate the future battlespace vision, develop operations concepts, test those operations by interacting with the fleet and the analytic community, then develop prototype doctrine. From approved doctrine can come training requirements as well as other methods to improve combat potential irrespective of technological change.

Introducing new ideas and managing change is a difficult task that requires the combat warrior's experience and leadership skills and the Washington in-fighter's administrative and bureaucratic skills. ***MR***

NOTES

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6. Senge, 3, 9, 205-32.
7. Admiral W.H. Standley, *Doctrinal War Instructions: United States Navy, 1934*, FTP 143 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 28 March 1934. These instructions stressed the future of joint warfare. FTP 143 revises an earlier version that drew on World War I lessons.
8. Senge, 340; see also Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16, 4 (Autumn 1993), 171, for a discussion of the need for "organizational learning."

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Diplomacy by Other Means: JTF *Aquila* Responds to Hurricane Mitch

by Brigadier General Virgil L. Packett II, US Army, and Captain Timothy M. Gilhool, US Army

In the 19th century, military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz called warfare "the continuation of diplomacy by other means." Entering the 21st century, US Armed Forces stand ready to meet that challenge and implement US foreign policy in other ways. The military now spearheads US diplomatic actions in the Balkans, leads the way in Eastern Europe through Partnership for Peace exchanges and will now conduct combined peacekeeping exercises with South Africa to strengthen ties in that region. An opportunity

US Army

A JTF medical officer attends to a young patient's minor injury.

to make a significant contribution in our hemisphere came in late October 1998.

Hurricane Mitch, a Category 5 storm ranging almost 1,500 miles in diameter and packing sustained winds of more than 290 kilometers per hour, tore a ragged path through the heart of Central America. Later described as the most destructive force to hit the region in modern times, it caused over $3.5 billion in damage and displaced over 3.1 million people. From tragedy, though, came growth, rehabilitation and renewal. The United States and its Central American neighbors worked together, forging new bonds of friendship after decades of revolution, bloodshed and misunderstanding.

Theater Engagement

Responsibility for the region of the Caribbean, Central and South America fell squarely on the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). SOUTHCOM is headquartered in Miami, Florida. It interacts with the nations in its area of operations through US Military Groups in local US embassies; component commands oriented on the region—US Army South (USARSO) Special Operations Command South and the 12th Air Force, which serves as Southern Command Air Forces—and forward-deployed joint task force (JTF) *Bravo* at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. The JTF has served as a forward base for US interests in the region since 1981. After USARSO left Panama, JTF *Bravo* became SOUTHCOM'S strategic gateway into the region.

Hurricane Mitch Response

On 6 November 1998, President Bill Clinton formally directed the Department of Defense to aid hurricane-stricken Central American countries. Before the formal order arrived, the commander in chief of SOUTHCOM, General Charles E. Wilhelm, had already considered the immense workload and decided to form a second JTF to coordinate and implement disaster relief operations in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

JTF *Bravo* simply could not leave the devastation in Honduras, which was just as significant if not greater than in the other countries, to provide the appropriate level of support elsewhere in Central America. The Hurricane Mitch disaster relief operation was dubbed Operation *Fuerte Apoyo*, which means "Strong Support," and the new JTF was named *Aquila*, which is Spanish for "Eagle."

While units were being deployed by their services to fill out the JTF, SOUTHCOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) arrived in-theater and quickly established basic life support and the operational base for JTF *Aquila*. Consisting primarily of planners, the DJTFAC was designed to join an existing JTF and help plan for future operations. This was the DJTFAC's first operational deployment. For Operation *Fuerte Apoyo*, the DJTFAC became an action cell, validating the concept and operational need for a contingency cell with a regional perspective and ties to the CINC's headquarters. The cell served as the advance staff until the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Atlantic Command and US Army Forces Command identified the rest of the units to fill out the JTF.

Following guidance from the CINC and JTF commander, DJTFAC developed the mission framework and wrote the JTF operations order. The commander's intent was to employ JTF *Aquila* expeditiously to mitigate near-term human suffering caused by Hurricane Mitch in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. After conducting medical and engineer assessments, the JTF would work to restore critical ground lines of communication and set the conditions for long-term recovery and rehabilitation in these countries.

The operation was divided into four phases: deployment, rehabilitation, transition and redeployment. A 90-day deployment was envisioned, with 20 days of movement into and out of the joint operations area (JOA) and 50 days of actual project work. The intent was to focus priorities and resources immediately for work in the most critical areas. Obviously, isolated areas needed humanitarian relief supplies—roads needed to be opened, especially to help local farmers get crops to market and to kick-start sagging economies. Gradually, operations would "step down," responsibility for individual countries in the JOA would transition to JTF *Bravo* and deployed units would return to their home stations.

Challenges

The limited number and quality of ports and airfields presented significant challenges for JTF *Aquila*'s deployment. The need for speed mandated that almost every unit deploy by strategic airlift. Nearly 5,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines from 32 bases in 18 different states

and one US territory moved by strategic airlift into the JOA.

Deployment

The seaward deployment and subsequent port operations were the largest that any of the three nations of Central America had seen. Logisticians had to establish port support operations from scratch, coordinate staging areas and prepare to receive the immense amount of equipment.

Reception. US-flagged cargo carriers, roll-on/roll-off ships and US Army utility landing craft transported over 2,000 pieces of rolling stock plus containers from the US ports of Beaumont, Texas, and Wilmington, North Carolina, to the sea port of debarkation (SPOD).

Staging and onward movement. Most staging areas were small, so rigid timelines were developed to ensure onward movement preceded subsequent ship arrivals. However this phase generated additional safety and security concerns and requirements for workers' and drivers' life support.

Integration. Integration went smoothly at Puerto Quetzal, the SPOD for initial deployment in Guatemala. Quetzal was only 10 kilometers from the forward operating base and was collocated with the main headquarters at Paracadista Base. Puerto Acaqutla in El Salvador was approximately 120 kilometers from JTF headquarters at Comalapa. This relatively short distance followed a narrow, winding road along the seashore, through hairpin turns, cliffs and seven tunnels and took one day to traverse. Nicaragua presented a more significant challenge. The 250-kilometer trek into the country's interior meant coordinating rest stops and an overnight stay with host nation (HN) security escorts. All convoys arrived on schedule with no accidents or damage to equipment or supplies, adding up to a total of 115,000 accident-free miles for operations in Nicaragua.

Engineer Assets

The primary goals of US military engineer units were to support HN efforts to relieve near-term human suffering, effect "remedial rehabilitation" of parts of the HN infrastructure and facilitate long-term regional recovery. Units could not rebuild every house, repave every road or return the countries to their pre-Mitch conditions within the operation's short span. However, they could make the difference between life and death for many people. Engineer priority of effort went to restoring critical ground lines of communication, including building stream and river crossings between farms and markets, repairing washed-out and heavily damaged roads and establishing a limited number of low-water crossings and footbridges.

US Army, Air Force and Marine engineers did yeoman's work. The more significant projects included hydrography design and construction in Guatemala and diverting two rivers in Nicaragua to help build low-water crossings and manage flood waters during the rainy season. Across the three countries, the units completed 64 primary and ancillary projects, including 200 kilometers of road repairs, 24 bridges and low-water crossings, four new wells, 115 cleaned and reclaimed wells and one new medical clinic. Although engineers could not totally repair all the damage caused by Hurricane Mitch, they did take care of the essentials (roads, bridges and clean water) and set the conditions for future work and further success.

Medical Services

Like JTF engineer operations, medical units deployed for Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* could not save all the people or cure all the ailments in the JOA. Their mission was two-fold: conduct medical assessments with HN ministries of health, providing technical assistance in rehabilitating human health services; and provide all levels of medical care to deployed US forces, including dental, psychiatric and trauma services. To provide these services to both the JOA and the JTF, the United States deployed almost 50 percent of the Army XVIII Airborne Corps' medical capability.

The final figures bear testify to the large impact of US military medical personnel. Over seven weeks, 34 medical humanitarian action missions treated nearly 16,000 people, the majority (10,187) in El Salvador. Veterinary units also treated 6,528 animals, giving 9,000 vaccinations. Most of these animals were dogs; it was remarked more than once that every Nicaraguan family must own one. The average Central American saw US Army nurses, Air Force doctors and Navy corpsmen more than any other element of the JTF. These service members personalized the United States' physical commitment to help after Hurricane Mitch.

Civil Affairs (CA)

While CA units cannot claim credit for the number of patients seen, kilometers of road repaired, gallons of potable water produced or the specifics of any other projects, they can claim credit for being involved in every operation. CA quickly became the focal point for coordination between the JTF and numerous HN government and non-government organizations, as well as several international relief and private volunteer organizations. The successes flowed from CA's linguistic skills and the enduring relationships from previous deployments to the region. In El Salvador, CA helped identify and resource additional humanitarian and disaster relief missions beyond the original project list. One of the biggest examples of this expansion involved US military vehicles moving nearly 800 short tons of donated food from the port of Acajutla to a distribution center in San Salvador. In Guatemala, CA teams were instrumental in procuring both medical and engineering supplies for the task force.

The Crown Jewel

Floods and mudslides wiped out the Nicaraguan village of Wiwili in the mountains north of Managua and with it an important medical clinic. One of the first US responses to Hurricane Mitch was a pledge to rebuild the clinic, a formidable task. Both the main and secondary roads leading to the village had been washed out, and all supplies would have to be brought in by helicopter.

Over the course of two months, CA personnel helped engineers and medical personnel from TF *Nicaragua* build two 40 by 100-foot structures,

complete with plumbing and electricity. They also donated medical equipment and supplies from the US Army and the US Agency for International Development.

Constructing the medical clinic combined the efforts of all JTF elements—engineer, medical, aviation, logistics, signal and civil affairs. The project attracted so much praise and attention that Clinton and Nicaragua's President Arnoldo Alamen asked to visit the site.

Accomplishments

Operating hand-in-hand with embassies, HN ministries, military leadership and private volunteer organizations in the JOA, JTF *Aquila* provided amazing relief. It treated nearly 16,000 patients; vaccinated 9,000 animals; repaired 24 bridges and river crossings and 207 kilometers of roadways; and delivered 6,500 short tons of relief supplies. These numbers exceeded the original estimate of what would be needed and represent the many additional and ancillary projects that developed as the mission continued.

JTF *Aquila* made a significant difference in the lives of thousands of people. Personal and professional relationships that developed between JTF soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and their hosts bode well for future international relations.

Only the magnitude of storm damage caused Nicaragua to allow US forces into the country. During the 1980s, US-Nicaraguan relations had been openly hostile as the United States trained and financed Contra rebels fighting Nicaragua's socialist, pro-Cuban government. Therefore, Nicaraguan Army Chief of Staff, General Joaquin Cuadra and the Nicaraguan government were skeptical of the US commitment to Central America.

Several other countries had pledged aid and support for disaster relief, only to leave after media attention subsided. When the JTF commander listed the amount of personnel, equipment and supplies the United States would be bringing into his country, Cuadra left the room. Returning with a pen and pad of paper, he asked the JTF commander to repeat the amounts. Other countries send words, Cuadra later said, America sends equipment. This US commitment and follow-through will reap benefits for years to come.

Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* was an enormous success for the US military and the people of Central America. US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines nobly represented their country. Troops interacted with villagers, soldiers and officials in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Stronger ties emerged with each country, especially Nicaragua, where the first official military-to-military contact in over two decades has been established, thanks to this operation.

Everything is Training

The US military has undertaken many missions since the Cold War's end. With continuing requirements to deploy units for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, commanders have become more concerned with combat readiness. Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* exercised units rather than distracting them from combat training. Deployment and on-the-ground operations were fantastic training opportunities for logistic, engineer, medical and aviation units to operate in an austere, real-world environment and perform wartime missions. The majority of units deployed in Central America did what they would do during wartime, training as they would fight. Units conducted rapid deployment; reception, staging, onward movement and integration operations; established their bases and life support; and rapidly transitioned to conduct operations. Force protection, though not at the same level as in an active combat zone, was a constant factor in mission planning and execution.

Over the course of three months, the JTF conducted many complex, simultaneous operations. Units, staffs and soldiers were tested against a real-world, lives-in-the-balance standard and passed with flying colors. Units that can move, operate and communicate well in a stressful peacetime deployment are well on their way to being ready for war.

The Future

The end of Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* is not the end of the story. It is in fact, a new beginning. Hurricane Mitch energized US involvement in Central America. The US government has committed itself to promoting long-term recovery in the region. JTF *Aquila* set the conditions and will continue operations, albeit with different units and commanders, from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras, directing US National Guard (NG) and Reserve Components (RC) New Horizons projects, which continue reconstructing damaged and destroyed roads, schools, houses and providing medical and technical assistance. Over 24,000 NG and RC troops—25 separate NG and RC battalions—were involved in disaster relief operations by the end of FY 1999. SOUTHCOM will have many projects for years to come, providing ample opportunity to strengthen friendships between the United States and Central American countries. Out of Hurricane Mitch came humanitarian assistance and foreign policy opportunities that will extend into the 21st Century. ***MR***

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Land Warfare: 21st-Century Theory and Doctrine

by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., US Army

For the fifth time in 20 years the US Army is rewriting its capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*. Today's Army is smaller, leaner, more technologically capable but also more fragile. With a smaller force, but a decisive technological edge, the modern Army's challenge is to achieve the nation's strategic objectives rapidly and decisively without using overpowering mass and fires.

The Army must make the right doctrinal choices for tomorrow in a world that is different but still dangerous. It needs a new doctrine and approach to joint warfare and joint operations. In the air and at sea, US adversaries cannot compete, but our land forces face many major threats. Because human conflicts remain struggles for land and its populations and resources, getting the doctrine of land warfare right is as important as anything the Army will do in the next generation.

Strategic Challenge

The Army's strategic posture has evolved in the post-Cold War era. Today's Army is a small, high-tech, force-projection Army with limited forward presence. To defeat potential opponents, the Army is structured to deploy rapidly over strategic distances to conduct joint and combined operations with other services and allies. US national strategy requires joint doctrine and training, service interoperability and high readiness levels to achieve credible deterrence, decisive victory in war and success in military operations other than war. Our declared strategy commits us to fighting and winning two major theater wars, each roughly equivalent to the Gulf War, which could overlap.

The United States no longer faces a hostile superpower threatening the nation's survival. But the Soviet Union's demise has brought a return to severe regional conflicts grounded in age-old religious, cultural and ethnic enmities. In the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the collapse of bipolarity has revived and encouraged inter- and intrastate conflicts. In the Korean Peninsula and Iran, authoritarian regimes preaching hatred of the west continue to threaten our allies and interests.

In some ways, the Army's task is now harder. While all the services are smaller, the Army has absorbed a disproportionate share of force reductions that followed the Cold War's end. The Army lost 40 percent of its active force structure and is now manned at its lowest level since before World War II. This loss of mass and supporting infrastructure is accompanied by deep cuts in the Army's budget. The Army is now less able to face powerful regional opponents with traditional methods.

For decades, the Army fought with overwhelming firepower and ample logistics, supported by dominant air and naval forces. Army doctrine emphasized positional, linear warfare. Army forces maneuvered to place massed firepower on the enemy. This approach to land warfare proved overwhelmingly successful in destroying enemy forces in the field. However, today's Army lacks the size, mass and abundant resources to wage prolonged positional warfare. Clearly, it is time for a bold shift in how we apply power to win on land.

Doctrine and Theory's Role

What is doctrine? The common short definition—"how to fight"—misses the crucial point that campaigns, battles and engagements are unique events, each with its own context and circumstances. The rigid application of rules or formulae is a sure road to disaster. Tactics, techniques and procedures show us how to fight. Doctrine shows us "how to think" about fighting. This distinction is the first step to understanding what doctrine is and why it is central to victory in battle. Doctrine is a thought process for solving problems in war. The basis of all doctrine is a sound theory of war.

The link between theory and doctrine is fundamental—indeed, inescapable—because theory provides two things we need to make decisions in war—a mental picture of the battlefield and a rational explanation of why and how things on the battlefield interact. Though its events might seem chaotic and random, the battlefield does have its own logic. Things happen for a reason. Reduced to its basic level, that is what theory does; it describes reality and explains how and why things that comprise that reality interact as they do.

Taken a step further, a theory of war is a system of ideas that explains the dynamics of armed conflict and guides decisionmakers to success in war. Theory is essential to understanding war because it provides a framework for understanding the battlefield and solving battlefield problems. As with other forms of social intercourse, trends or related phenomena in the realm of human conflict continually recur throughout history.

Theory makes sense of war's apparent chaos by linking threads of continuity to make a coherent whole. Without theory, doctrine is little more than a random collection of principles or truisms. We use theory to comprehend the nature of human conflict and structure the way we organize forces, frame actions and conduct battlefield operations. Doctrine provides the link between theory and practice.

Of course no theory is absolute,

portraying warfare with perfect clarity and its outcomes as perfectly rational. That is why theorists who claim to predict outcomes are so often wrong. Theory cannot be predictive, but it can provide the decisionmaker a coherent explanation of what is happening and what needs to happen. Crudely put, the 80 percent solution gained by applying sound theory to battlefield understanding is a huge step forward, considering the alternative.

Our deep, rich doctrinal heritage has been a major source of success in war. Nevertheless, we have always skirted the role of theory in the attempt to formulate, publish and apply doctrine. Although the Army has a theory of war, for many reasons it has avoided the deeper questions of why things happen as they do in combat. Given the immense resources the Army traditionally has brought to the battlefield, the focus on material and technical aspects of land warfare has been enough to prevail. In the next century, this approach might prove badly out of place.

Theories of War

Broadly speaking, there are two theories or schools of thought about how armies should fight. One emphasizes firepower and mass as the centerpieces of combat operations and views maneuver as moving forces for positional advantage to deliver massed fires. It sees the battlefield as essentially linear, an environment that can be ordered and controlled. Synchronization, detailed planning and coordination, centralized command and control and an orientation on seizing and controlling terrain features are hallmarks of this "positional" or "methodical" theory of warfare.

Positional theory emphasizes technology and technical solutions to battlefield problems. In positional warfare, commanders seek to achieve fire superiority and positional advantage to bring the enemy to battle and destroy his forces. Battles and engagements are valuable opportunities to wear down the opponent. This approach is well suited to large, industrial nations with the wealth and population to field and sustain large armies. United States General U.S. Grant, French Marshal Joseph Joffre and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery practiced this approach to war. With able practitioners and ample resources, positional warfare has been an effective basis for doctrine and operations.

An alternative theory of war sees the enemy's will to resist—not his armies or the terrain he holds—as the true object. Conceptually, maneuver applies strength against enemy weakness to crush resistance rapidly on a battlefield dominated by friction and confusion. While the force's size is always important, this alternative theory of war does not require numerical or technological superiority. Instead, leadership and training are its center of gravity. It uses firepower to create conditions for decisive maneuver, not to overwhelm the enemy. Speed, operating tempo, decentralized command and control and a strong focus on the enemy, not terrain, are its hallmarks.

Sometimes called nonlinear or maneuver warfare, this approach emphasizes surprise, deception, agility and the human dimensions of warfare. It relies less on detailed, deliberate planning and synchronization and more on rapid decisionmaking based on commander's intent. Nations who are numerically or technologically inferior often use this approach. Confederate General Nathan B. Forrest, German General Heinz Guderian and US General George S. Patton enjoyed great success as practitioners of this mode of warfare. Because today's US military is smaller, leaner and less well resourced, and because Americans expect rapid success at low cost, this form of warfare is better suited for today's Army.

Nations at war sometimes appear to use features from both schools. In any war, some forces will fight positional or linear battles, while others will use movement to gain an advantage. However, all nations are influenced by and base their doctrines of land warfare on one general approach or the other.

In modern history, the French, British, Russians and Americans have stressed positional warfare, deliberate decisionmaking and overwhelming mass as the keys to victory. The Germans, North Vietnamese, Chinese and Israelis—either outnumbered or inferior in firepower—have emphasized fluid warfare, decentralized decisionmaking and maneuver. Both theories offer coherent explanations of how maneuver, fires, leadership and mass should relate to each other on the battlefield. Each nation relates them in different ways and pursues a different vision of how to subdue the enemy.

An army's character is decisively influenced by the theory of war it embraces. Armies cannot switch casually from one theory, or one doctrine, to another. While they might fight positionally at one time and place and emphasize maneuver at another, they cannot embrace both philosophies at the same time as a basis for service doctrine. No army can embrace both centralized and decentralized command and control. No army can simultaneously focus on destruction by fire and dislocation and disruption by maneuver. While individual commanders can sometimes impose their visions and views of warfare on their commands by sheer force of personality and will, armies as a whole tend to fight according to one style of warfare.

Although the United States is the sole remaining superpower, a number of constraints shape the way it fights as a land power. Some constraints are resource driven; others result from institutional history and culture. Therefore, US Army warfighting doctrine:

- Must be broadly compatible with joint doctrine and the doctrine of major allies and coalition partners.
- Must be based on a force structure and resource level that can be sustained over time; that is, it must not depend on numerical superiority or massive firepower that might or might not be available.
- Must apply to all levels of armed conflict and all geographic regions in which the Army is likely to

fight.

- Must maximize opportunities for a rapid, decisive result at the lowest possible cost in casualties and resources.
- Should not assume it will have powerful coalition partners or secure lodgments.
- Should assume air and naval superiority.
- Should exploit the US technological edge over potential enemies.
- Must incorporate asymmetric threats, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

With these parameters in mind, the Army can think more clearly about future attempts to refine doctrine.

Maneuver Doctrine

Although the Army is smaller and leaner, it has strengths that make it the most agile and lethal army in the world. American technology is unmatched, and US air and naval power guarantee that land operations will be supported by strong strategic logistics and overwhelming air and naval fires. The quality of the US soldier remains high, and in the last 15 years the Army has produced a tradition of success and rapid, decisive victory.

Despite these strengths, reductions in the Army's size and the requirement to be able to simultaneously conduct two major regional wars mean that traditional reliance on fires and mass no longer applies. Lost overseas bases and a wide range of possible contingencies stretch the smaller Army's capabilities even more. Thus, combat doctrine must rely on speed, agility, shock and deception to avoid enemy strengths and to strike enemy weaknesses.

High-quality leaders and soldiers, armed with superior technology and battlefield information, provide the ability to seize and hold the initiative even without superior numbers. By decisively concentrating these strengths against enemy centers of gravity, we can destroy the enemy's will and ability to resist before his main forces have been defeated. In this way, the Army can capitalize on its unique strengths to prevail against opponents without protracted combat and high losses in troops, equipment and damage to surrounding areas.

These concepts suggest a doctrinal thought process oriented on the enemy's *will* to resist, not his *means* to resist; the use of strength against weakness, not strength against strength; decentralized command, not centralized command; and use of fires to support decisive maneuver, not maneuver to position massed fires. Maneuver-based doctrine stresses a rapid decision as the goal, with speed, focus and the commander's intent as means to that end. Positional doctrine stresses the destruction of the enemy's main body as the goal, with the accumulation of combat power, seizure of terrain features and emphasis on the mission statement as means to the end. The contrast between the two is striking—and for good reason. Each is based on a strikingly different theory of war.

Maneuver-based doctrine relies on flexible, disciplined and decisive commanders to focus combat power against weak points. In today's operating environment, the ultimate objective of combat operations is to achieve a rapid decision. Everything else the Army does must support this central aim. Therefore, doctrine must preach—in fact, demand—maximum initiative at all levels, operating within the framework of commander's intent.

A shift from doctrine based on the theory of mass to one based on the theory of maneuver would incorporate the following elements:

- Attacking critical enemy vulnerabilities whose loss will cause dislocation, disruption and collapse of an opponent's capacity to resist.
- Establishing a focus of effort and concentrating decisive combat power against these vulnerabilities.
- Applying friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses to break the enemy's will.
- Avoiding force-on-force campaigns, battles and engagements that cost time, consume resources and reduce freedom of movement.
- Seizing and holding the initiative at all times through rapid offensive action.
- Capturing and exploiting battlefield information and denying it to the enemy.

Offensively, maneuver operations seek first to attack soft targets—command posts, artillery positions, logistic support areas—to disrupt and dislocate the enemy's defense. Direct attacks against enemy strong points are avoided. Where possible, the enemy's air defense and fire support systems are suppressed or neutralized before or during the direct-fire battle. Defensively, maneuver operations hold key terrain with static forces arrayed in depth and attack with mobile reserves and counterattack forces to stop, disrupt and destroy the attacker.

These concepts provide a framework for building combat doctrine. More than at any time since 1945, US national security demands an Army that can deploy quickly and win decisively without relying on protracted campaigns, large forces or overwhelming resources. The US brings many strengths to this challenge, including advanced technology, strong leadership, a supportive democratic society, a tradition of victory and the best soldiers in the world. The Army's combat doctrine must weld these together to create a decisive instrument of land warfare—a 21st-century US Army. ***MR***

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NEO Operations: The SETAF Experience

by Lieutenant General Edward P. Smith, US Army Pacific

In March 1997, when advancing rebels in Zaire threatened the safety of American citizens in Kinshasa, a joint task force (JTF) led by the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), Vicenza, Italy, was activated. Deployed and positioned immediately across the Congo River from Kinshasa, the task force validated the need for a trained and ready force to evacuate noncombatants. This noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) by US European Command (EUCOM) became known as Operation *Guardian Retrieval.*

Other contingencies and the many planning and training events since *Guardian Retrieval* helped SETAF become one of the few EUCOM assets that can routinely execute noncombatant evacuation operations. As the only light US Army conventional unit in Europe, SETAF regularly trains for that mission, providing the core JTF headquarters and an Army Force (ARFOR) ground maneuver element.

SETAF has recently executed a series of computer-assisted exercises (CAX) and field training exercises (FTX) as an evacuation force supporting a US ambassador-ordered noncombatant evacuation. Actual NEO operations validate the need for speed and agility in all aspects of planning and execution.

SETAF's fundamental NEO principle is simple: stay ready. This is easy to say, but how can we do it? Current doctrine touts the virtues of adequately preparing, shaping and responding to NEO operations.

Preparing

Preparing for NEO support begins with anticipating requirements. SETAF uses normal G2 intelligence sources; the civil affairs officer uses extensive links to open-source regional analyses by nongovernment organizations (NGO), private organizations (PVO), United Nations (UN) and other agencies; and the public affairs officer scrutinizes developing world and regional affairs and conditions. All rely heavily on automation and connectivity with various information sources to track events that might involve SETAF.

SETAF staff planners and other service liaison officers regularly meet and review plans for possible NEOs in the five to seven hot spots that SETAF routinely tracks. This head start is recorded and updated on secure automation templates for time-sensitive, JTF stand-up planning.

Unified command operations plans (OPLAN) or contingency plans must always be supplemented with current operational and logistic course-of-action options. Completed off-the-shelf OPLANs are normally dated and inflexible and, therefore, need updating for use in volatile NEO environments.

SETAF regularly conducts training on using informational templates. Training includes:

- Monthly NEO staff planning drills.
- Twice-a-year seminars on JTF operations led by a mobile joint training team from Atlantic Command or Fort Leavenworth's Battle Command Training Program-Delta.
- An annual certification computer-assisted exercise.
- Crisis-action planning in anticipation of possible activation as a JTF headquarters.

Because there is little time for crisis-action planning after the JTF activates, the organizations EUCOM designates as potential JTF headquarters must train ahead. This requires an appreciation of the unique value a JTF headquarters adds.

Shaping

Shaping begins and ends in the JTF headquarters. The initial mission and joint troop-to-task analyses are the early, critical condition-setting steps that ensure the NEO's success. A JTF staff shapes the conditions under which the NEO will be executed by drilling a uniservice headquarters and its augmentees to consider joint-force capabilities, appreciate precise information preparation of the NEO area battlespace and leverage all other-service augmentation. Shaping also includes:

- Tailoring and deploying early the correct assessment and requirement-validation team and decision-support staff after arming them with state-of-the art automation and reach-back communications.
- Immediately initiating an adaptive, proactive, complementary information campaign plan to create as benign an environment as possible for NEO and to gain the confidence of all involved, especially the supported ambassador and his embassy country team.
- Smoothly deploying the right joint force package at the right time to the right locations.
- Interfacing effectively with allied formations executing concurrent NEOs as well as with international organizations, NGOs, PVOs and host-nation officials.
- Maintaining ready participant forces from different services, each trained, disciplined, focused and clearly informed about rules of engagement and execution guidance.

The NEO shaping function is merely an extension of the continuous preparation to activate, form, deploy and respond.

Responding

Depending on in-place systems and simple repetitious training, SETAF response is a function of integrated and synchronic joint systems, including force protection, movement control, targeting, logistics and intelligence.

During Operation *Guardian Retrieval,* a SETAF-led JTF prepared to respond to an anticipated NEO in Western Zaire. Condition shaping was effective because the SETAF training program and standing operating procedures enabled the quick formation and deployment of initial forces. The JTF's mere presence and evacuation capabilities stabilized the situation. These initial JTF

enabling forces, including tactical airlift control elements, planning headquarters and assessment teams resulted in:

- A positive reception of US military forces by military and political officials.
- A minimum, forward-response force footprint.
- A US-initiated cooperation effort involving other international forces preparing for NEO.
- Proper use of information tools to sustain a NEO under nonhostile conditions.

SETAF learned in subsequent NEO preparations the danger of planning to use one JTF under permissive conditions then using another when conditions changed from uncertain to hostile. Such a command and control shift is fraught with problems that can contribute to failure. The obvious hazards of inserting a new JTF into uncertain or hostile conditions worsen when added to the lost relationship between the embassy and the initial JTF.

This mid-stream JTF exchange often occurs when attempting to respond "on the cheap," sending minimum forces to reduce political, military and economic costs, and often remaining within an imprecise "force cap." This approach violates the principles of war and operations other than war. It would be more logical to organize, equip and train joint forces to execute two NEO options: emergency evacuation and deliberate evacuation.

Emergency evacuation is a short-notice, high-risk operation using the most highly deployable, special operations forces available. Deliberate evacuation can be large, small or complicated. Its defining characteristic is that there is ample time to tailor and train a force and prepare for the move.

Responding effectively to a NEO requires the same resources as during preparation and shaping. Steady commitment to readiness training is the key. SETAF has learned how to prepare, shape and respond to NEOs and gears its normal garrison operations and systems to ensure speed and agility in all functions. ***MR***

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Task Force *Eagle* and the Battle of the Buses

by Brigadier General David L. Grange, US Army, Retired

In September 1997, Task Force (TF) *Eagle's* 1st Infantry Division was wrapping up eight months of peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina when it received a delay order from Stabilization Force (SFOR) headquarters. This operation was to serve the same purpose as a delay during combat, but it had no established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for peace support operations (PSO).

Multi-National Division-North (MND-N)—TF *Eagle*—received the delay mission to buy time for Multi-National Division-Southwest (MND-SW), which was stabilizing a dangerous political/police conflict in Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska (VRS), the government seat of elected VRS President Biljana Plavsic.

The Delay Begins

The Pale, VRS, shadow government, headed by Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik, planned an aggressive demonstration with a "rent-a-mob" to upstage a political rally sponsored by the legal government. Reliable intelligence, confirmed by eyes-on information sources, reported that from 500 to 1,000 Serbs armed with clubs, rocks and liquor were boarding buses near Pale. Krajisnik, already in Banja Luka with his henchmen and special police, orchestrated local belligerents' activities. Political leaders and SFOR commanders were concerned that the fragile Plavsic government could not withstand an onslaught of manipulative, drunken Pale Serbs. The MND-SW commander had the resources to control the situation if TF *Eagle* could delay the Serb masses until the rally ended. When the delay fragmentary order to MND-N arrived, the task force quickly refocused forces conducting other PSO. However, some coalition forces required prompting to react with the necessary speed.

Between 20 and 40 Serb buses were moving north out of the French sector (MND-SE) into the MND-N area of operations (AOR). Initial orders were to take "some time" with the inspection, checking all buses, searching and confiscating weapons, then allowing the buses to move on. Since Pale-controlled media had painted the Serb's actions as a "peaceful political rally," the commander's intent was to maintain legitimacy and prevent being accused of supporting one political group over another.

Almost every bus contained 20- to 40-year-old men who were drunk, aggressive and determined to get to Banja Luka quickly. The buses, driven by drunken drivers, moved at excessive speeds, usually in loosely organized convoys of from 5 to 15 vehicles. This dangerous situation threatened the small-unit leaders and soldiers occupying hastily constructed roadblocks.

Support Requirements

Because the buses could not transit Bosnian-Croat Federation territory, the Serbs had to remain within Srpska, which forced them through

checkpoints at Zvornik, Brcko and Modrica. Also, many roads were not conducive to bus traffic. These factors allowed time for a quick intelligence assessment that helped US forces take advantage of the terrain and lines of communications and establish support requirements:

- Delay the Pale Serbs in the AOR until 1800.
- Maintain continuous contact with the buses.
- Wear down the buses' drivers and occupants.
- Establish no-penetration lines for certain periods, then if necessary, stop all movement.
- Avoid decisive engagement and adhere to rules of engagement except as a last resort.
- Establish centralized control with decentralized operations.
- Conduct positive handoff of buses between coalition sectors.
- Maximize use of terrain and obstacles.
- Set up hasty roadblocks and strengthen them as time permitted.
- Mask tactical intent to the Serb population throughout the AOR.
- Plan for nonlethal means of crowd control.
- Provide prompt, accurate reporting using control measures, phase line crossings, passing checkpoints, occupying battle positions and "engagements."
- Establish both a mechanized and an air-assault reserve.
- Avoid establishing positions in large towns to make it harder for the Serbs to mass crowds.

Delay Tactics

Southern-sector positions were the hardest to establish quickly because of troop movement times and the need to erect hasty roadblocks. This sector, from Mount Zep north to Zvornik, was under TF *1-41 Infantry's* command, which managed to establish several successful roadblocks near Zvornik. Although some buses bypassed these positions using secondary routes, they were stopped at the major TF *1-41* roadblock just south of the Russian sector. Some US forces experienced difficult and tense situations; Serbs exited the buses and attempted to remove the obstacles and overrun the position, but US units maintained discipline and staved off the "attacking" Serbs.

US units delayed the increasing number of buses by conducting lengthy inspections. They also negotiated with self-proclaimed leaders—including the Zvornik police chief—then allowed buses to proceed behind slow-moving SFOR vehicles that took up most of the roadway.

Once the buses entered the Russian AOR, they were again stopped, but only for a short time. The 40-bus convoy picked up speed between Bijeljina—the last major town in the Russian sector—and Brcko—the first major town in the US sector. As the Serbs moved north into the Posavina Corridor, local buses with preplanned reinforcements joined them. The determined Serbs were massing forces—now including 75 buses—and picking up momentum.

The next major roadblock network, just west of Brcko, was to prevent large, hostile crowds from assembling that could put US soldiers into a mob predicament. TF *1-77 Armor* aggressively delayed outside Brcko, handling several heated encounters with drunken and belligerent Serbs. The Serbs were weakening, however. They were tired, hungry and beginning to succumb to the hot September day.

In the Posavina Corridor, US units took advantage of available preparation time to develop a strong series of integrated positions supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers. AH-64 Apache helicopters and a Predator aerial observation vehicle provided constant reports on the buses' progress and picked up buses that bypassed delay positions by using secondary roads and trails. Time and again, Serb bus drivers took 50-passenger buses onto roads previously thought impassable. At times, SFOR raced Serbs to critical crossroads to cut off buses that had penetrated phase lines.

Civilian traffic mingling with the buses soon jammed the road network, adding to the number of increasingly agitated and angry Serbs. Some international organization and nongovernment organization vehicles caught in the traffic became the focus of Serb wrath and were overturned—one even set on fire. US soldiers moved in quickly to protect these civilians.

The Serbs began to use a tactic that caused an immediate problem for high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted roadblock elements: they would unload up to 10 buses—about 500 people—at a roadblock and simply overrun the small, isolated group of soldiers. A force-protection issue arose when reinforcing mechanized units could not get to US troops without harming civilians. Linkups always occurred but were tenuous, demonstrating again junior leaders' and troops' courage, judgment and discipline.

When the Serbs encountered roadblocks reinforced with tracked vehicles, it was much harder for them to overwhelm US soldiers. The tracked vehicles stopped all vehicle traffic while dismounted soldiers controlled the mobs—an increasingly difficult and dangerous foot-soldier task. Ultimately, because of the many secondary roads and trails, penetrations and bypasses occurred.

Helicopters proved to be a valuable asset in the delay. AH-64 Apaches reported and recorded on video any Serbs who brandished weapons. Knowing that the buses would be searched at all roadblocks, the Serbs soon began to use privately owned vehicles (POVs) to precede the buses. Once the buses stopped, individuals in the POVs would take weapons from car trunks and distribute them to bus occupants. Roadblock positions were warned of possible firefights, and video still frames from the Apaches were later used as evidence of a lethal mob moving on Banja Luka, adding further credibility to peace-enforcement activities and tactics that day.

UH-60 Black Hawks were critical to outmaneuvering the Serbs, who were confined to the clogged road network. US units used the air-assault reserve on one occasion to land, break through to and reinforce a surrounded roadblock manned by an armored cavalry regiment HMMWV element that did not have enough dismounted soldiers to con-

trol the crowd it faced. In another case, a UH-60 delivered nonlethal agents and crowd-control equipment to a unit facing a rapidly deteriorating situation. Although the problem was resolved and the equipment was not needed, the US troops' overwhelming mobility was critical to success.

As the buses approached the boundary between TF *1-77* and the Norwegian-Polish (NORDPOL) AOR, US forces contained the mobs through complex negotiations that included bluffing drunken mob leaders and involving local police and mayors. By the end of the day, the crowd was worn down by the series of confrontations. TF *1-77* was able to maintain presence until dark. The final no-penetration line, to be enforced until 2000, was just short of the NORDPOL AOR boundary, where the delay was handed off to the MND-N force.

The Outcome

If the buses had regained momentum before 2000, snipers were prepared to shoot bus tires. This proved unnecessary. Overzealous bus drivers, trying to pass other buses in the opposing traffic lane, created a massive roadblock and Serb-on-Serb arguments began everywhere. When the arguments were over and the buses finally sorted out, it was well past 2000. Even though Serb mobs rolled burning tires into roadblocks and used other bypass techniques, the NORDPOL brigade delayed them until 2200. However, most of the highly intoxicated Serbs simply fell asleep on the buses.

Initial orders had been to delay until 1800. The mission was an overwhelming success with far-reaching implications; TF *Eagle* delayed the buses an additional 4 hours. That night, CNN televised to the world Krajisnik's public disgrace. He never received his expected "army of thugs" and was forced to leave Banja Luka. Plavsic remained in office and, in fact was bolstered by events. The well-disciplined soldiers of TF *Eagle* did not fire a shot, and no one was seriously injured.

Leaders and soldiers developed outstanding TTPs and followed doctrine on delay operations as written in US Army Field Manual (FM) 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, modified according to mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time for PSO. This doctrine carried the day, for the TF *Eagle* soldiers, buttressed by the efforts of coalition partners, quickly adapted the tenets of delay operations to PSO conditions and standards. The operation followed the same sage principles chronicled for warfighting conditions and standards in FM 71-3—delay with the fewest troops possible, retain the initiative, maintain flexibility and protect the troops. The principles remained constant, but the techniques differed. This great versatility—adapting warfighting principles to PSO quickly and with ease—validated the great capabilities of courageous, well-trained US Army soldiers offer to the ever-changing global situation. ***MR***

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MR Almanac

The Bonus March: A Forgotten Stain

by Lieutenant Colonel Bryon Greenwald, US Army

The Depression-era Bonus March on Washington by World War I veterans resulted from a lame congressional attempt to provide them a pension. In 1924, over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, Congress passed the World War Veterans Act that gave each veteran an "adjusted compensation certificate." The certificates amounted to endowment life insurance redeemable in 1945. Congress "adjusted" the value of each certificate based on the length of time each man had spent in service during World War I. On redemption, the average benefit equaled about $1,000.[1]

Veterans who returned to civilian life found their economic well-being shattered a decade later by the Great Depression's harsh economic conditions. As unemployment soared to 25 percent by 1932 and banks failed by the hundreds, veterans and millions of other Americans were soon out of work, out of money and struggling to survive.[2]

In 1931, Congress moved to alleviate some of the veterans' suffering. Over President Herbert Hoover's veto, Congress passed an amendment to the Veterans Act of 1924 and authorized veterans to borrow up to half the value of their adjusted compensation certificate. In early 1925, Texas Congressman Wright Patman proposed a bill that would have authorized immediate payment of the balance of the bonus to veterans.

Hoover opposed the bill, fearing that if he gave in to the veterans movement, other organizations' similar demands would eventually break the Federal Treasury. Hoover believed that giving money to the

veterans would encourage social welfare advocates, who he felt were seeking to demolish any remaining "barriers of self-reliance and self-support in our people."[3] Despite Hoover's opposition, the House passed the measure and sent it to the Senate for a vote.

To influence the ongoing congressional debate, thousands of veterans journeyed to Washington from all over the country during the spring and early summer of 1932. Unemployed cannery worker Walter W. Waters and a small group of Oregon veterans began the movement and initiated what would become the national Bonus March.

Press coverage of the Oregonians' plight soon brought like-minded, unemployed veterans to Washington from all over the country, usually traveling free of charge, thanks to sympathetic freight and passenger train operators. By mid-July, estimates numbered the force at 20,000 men.[4]

Some men and their families camped in hastily erected shanties and lean-tos in abandoned and partially demolished buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue. The largest "town"—Camp Marks—was just across the Anacostia River. The camp's name honored the kindly commander of the neighboring 11th Precinct, Police Captain S.J. Marks.

The Participants

Of the four major groups participating in the Bonus March, the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the largest. The BEF, led by Waters, was a disciplined, organized, law-abiding group of veterans assembled from across the country. The BEF kept order within its ranks and even published a weekly newspaper, *The BEF News*. BEF members had not traveled to Washington to break laws or foment unrest; they simply wanted to petition Congress for relief from the Depression's effects.

Although largely noncommunist, the BEF did have a few Communist Party members. Their small but vocal presence eventually created a negative image and heavily influenced Hoover's and Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur's opinions. In late June, after the Senate defeated Patman's Bonus Bill, Waters added to the BEF's negative image when he openly hinted at creating a militant socialist force called the "Khaki Shirts" to fight against the "sordid scheme of special privilege."[5]

MacArthur was suspicious of the BEF's motives. His suspicion came from his visceral hatred of communism, which had been bolstered by a series of incidents initiated by radical groups dating to the 1919-1920 Red Scare. Although the violence that rocked America during the Red Scare had subsided with time and growing economic prosperity, the Depression reawakened the fear of radical movements. Several radical outbursts in Washington and elsewhere in the seven months before the Bonus March only exacerbated MacArthur's skepticism.

To confirm his suspicions, MacArthur cabled the nine Corps Area Commanders and asked for reports on BEF communist elements. The commanders concluded that no evidence pointed toward a Red-controlled uprising. Major General Malin Craig, who succeeded MacArthur as Chief of Staff, replied that marchers from his area were fervent anticommunists.

MacArthur ardently believed that the Bonus March was a communist vehicle for inciting revolution. He reinforced Washington's Army garrison, began special antiriot training at nearby Fort Myer, ordered tanks lubricated and brought several experimental vehicles from Aberdeen Proving Ground. He also carefully reviewed a revised version of the Army's "White Plan" for quelling civil disturbances in Washington. The White Plan's key to restoring order was using tear gas to disrupt rioters and, as MacArthur hinted, possibly "more drastic action" against "the Reds" after "giving an opportunity to the noncommunist veterans to disperse."[6]

Hoover was growing increasingly despondent over his inability to end the Depression. However, he vehemently opposed handouts for the Bonus Marchers. The frequent disturbances forced him into seclusion. He made fewer public appearances, increased the number of White House guards and padlocked the White House gates.

In summer 1932, amid the growing suffering, suspicion and insecurity that enveloped Washington, Police Superintendent for the District of Columbia Pelham Glassford stood out in his attempts to alleviate the BEF's distress and poverty. Glassford was an intelligent, charming man and had been a World War I brigadier. He empathized with the veterans' plight, believing they should be treated with compassion but encouraged to return home. To that end, Glassford solicited donations of shelter, food, clothing and money on the veterans' behalf. For a time, he even managed the BEF's finances and gave them $1,000 for food and supplies.

As the primary intermediary between the BEF and the administration, Glassford tried to make the best of a bad situation and diffuse the Bonus Marchers without resorting to force.[7] But, Glassford's superiors, the DC Commissioners, saw him as being "soft" on the Bonus Marchers. At the peak of the crisis, they accused him of improperly handling the eviction of veterans from the abandoned buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue.

An Ignominious End

After a series of meetings on 27 July 1932 between Hoover, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, MacArthur, Mitchell, and the DC Commissioners, the BEF was given an ultimatum: vacate the abandoned buildings. Hoover decided to proceed with the planned demolition of the buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue and ordered the DC Commissioners to have Glassford and the police evict any veterans from the structures by the next morning.[8]

Initially, the eviction went smoothly. Around noon, however, BEF members gathered on Pennsylvania Avenue where the evictions were taking place. In response, Glassford called for all the policemen

in Washington to report to the scene. By early afternoon the confrontation turned bloody as veterans began hurling bricks at police. Glassford ordered the DC Commissioners to stop the evictions for the day to allow tempers to cool.

Glassford told the commissioners that the Army might be needed, should the eviction continue. The commissioners interpreted Glassford's warning as an admission that the police could not handle the situation and that afternoon appealed to Hoover for federal troops. Hoover agreed and called MacArthur. After receiving what amounted to a presidential warning order, MacArthur ordered an Army contingent to assemble at the Ellipse near the White House. As the conflict worsened, a policeman accidentally shot and mortally wounded a veteran while trying to evict him. At the War Department, the Secretary of War ordered MacArthur to "proceed immediately to the scene of disorder. . . . Surround the affected area and clear it without delay. . . . Use all humanity consistent with the due execution of this order."[9]

By late afternoon, MacArthur led the Army contingent—one infantry battalion, one horse cavalry squadron, and one tank platoon—down Pennsylvania Avenue. Using great quantities of tear gas to flush out the veterans and horse cavalry to intimidate them, the Army quickly cleared the area and began to herd the veterans toward the Anacostia River and Camp Marks. Around dusk, MacArthur stopped to rest and feed the soldiers. He ordered Glassford to warn any veterans remaining at Camp Marks that the Army was approaching and to evacuate the area. As the troops neared Anacostia Bridge, Hurley twice sent messengers to MacArthur, telling him that Hoover did not want the veterans pursued across the Anacostia River. Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, MacArthur's aide, later noted that MacArthur heard neither message. Eisenhower wrote that MacArthur claimed to be "too busy and did not want either himself or his staff bothered by people coming down and pretending to bring orders."[10]

Near midnight, as veterans began to set fire to the tents they had borrowed from the National Guard, troops crossed the river and entered Camp Marks. About two thousand stragglers assembled at the camp's south end, but tear gas grenades forced them to disperse. Two hours after midnight, the camp was quiet and troops bivouacked for the night. Guards were posted and Coast Artillery searchlights swept back and forth to illuminate the area.[11] MacArthur's apparent success must have made Hoover forget his earlier instructions because his staff informed reporters that "the "President [was] pleased."[12]

The Aftermath

Immediate reaction to the Bonus Marcher's eviction was overwhelmingly supportive. Several newspapers headlined stories endorsing the eviction, calling the marchers "a riff-raff mob," the "assault on police unjustified" and the "President fully justified."[13] Officially, Hoover justified the use of federal troops as necessary to "put an end to [the] rioting and defiance of civil authority [and] restore order."[14] Senior Hoover administration members claimed the BEF consisted of "criminal, communist and nonveteran elements" and was a "polyglot mob of tramps and hoodlums, with a generous sprinkling of communist agitators."[15] MacArthur claimed the Bonus Marchers were a "bad-looking mob . . . animated by the essence of revolution."[16]

In reality, hardly any criminals or communists were among the BEF. Ninety-four percent were bonafide veterans and few had ever committed a crime of consequence. They were neither communists animated by revolution nor fascists looking to overthrow the government. They were simply average, hard-luck Americans exercising their constitutional right to assemble and petition the government. Once these facts came to light, public support for the eviction declined precipitously. *The Washington News* received hundreds of letters, 90 percent of which criticized the administration's handling of the BEF.[17]

In addition to criticizing the Hoover Administration, newspaper editorials criticized both the Army and its chief of staff. Incomplete reporting led to charges that the Army had used excessive force. Unlike the administration, however, the Army was largely free from blame. Although a few marchers were injured and one infant died from inhaling tear gas, the Army acted with immense restraint. The Army employed tanks and horse cavalry to intimidate the marchers and opened 2,000 tear gas canisters to disperse crowds, but troops did not fire a single shot. Despite the Army's care to "use all humanity consistent" with its mission, stories and pictures in the press highlighted the eviction's impact on the veterans and their families and played on public sympathy for the homeless and unemployed.

Criticism of MacArthur was much more accurate. He had seriously misjudged the BEF's nature and overstepped his authority in ordering the Army across the Anacostia Bridge. The combined weight of these criticisms led to a decline in public trust and the Army's popular image.

The Forgotten Stain

Today the Bonus March is largely a forgotten incident. Using the Army to quell civil disturbances runs counter to traditional notions about the use of military force. This attitude continues despite both the Army's long history of such roles and the mission's recent codification in the Army's operations other than war (OOTW) doctrine.[18] During the Bonus March the Army turned on its own unemployed veterans who had served the country with honor and were only exercising their rights as Americans. Major George S. Patton, executive officer for the participating cavalry squadron, evicted the man who had saved his life in France during World War I.[19]

MacArthur's conduct evokes images of the Army acting beyond the bounds of its duly constituted authority. While this controversy

falls far short of threatening US civil-military relations, it nevertheless reminds us of MacArthur's more substantial and chastening conflict with his civilian president during the Korean War.[20] Even MacArthur's biographer, D. Clayton James, characterized the chief of staff's efforts during the Bonus March as the product of "overzealous determination and reckless impulsiveness."[21]

The Bonus March as OOTW

An analysis of the Bonus March using the OOTW principles in FM 100-5, *Operations*, leads to the following conclusions about what the Army did well and where it performed poorly.[22]

Unity of effort. Federal troops and Washington police worked well together. Once Hoover ordered troops to the scene, Glassford conferred frequently with MacArthur to avoid duplication of effort. The police and the Army divided tactical missions and supported each other throughout the operation.

Security. The Army maintained tight security throughout the eviction and never allowed the veterans to acquire an unexpected advantage. Despite the likelihood of injury during the operation, only 12 soldiers were wounded—four by bricks and eight by their own tear gas.

Restraint. The Army exercised remarkable restraint in evicting the Bonus Marchers. The troops adhered to the rules of engagement and employed weapons and tactics well-suited for crowd control and civil disturbances.

Objective. Hoover did not clearly define what he wanted MacArthur to do, an error MacArthur used to full advantage. His actions in crossing the Anacostia Bridge without clear orders to do so reflect the nagging problem contemporary commanders face in defining end states and operational parameters in OOTW. MacArthur's predilection to paint the BEF as a communist-inspired vehicle for inciting revolution combined with the ambiguous guidance he received from Hurley to create a version of "mission creep." Hurley's "area" consisted of the abandoned buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue. MacArthur's "area" was the nation's capital. Ironically, the mission creep did not occur because civilian leaders altered their objectives in the middle of the operation; it resulted from MacArthur's selective interpretation of ambiguous mission orders to suit his preconceived ideas.

Legitimacy. Although no one questioned Hoover's right to govern the nation or maintain order in the capital, his bungling of the Bonus March cost his administration and the Army popular legitimacy. The administration, abetted by rabid anti-communists, seriously misjudged the BEF's intent and ignored Glassford's pleas for firm but compassionate treatment. Panic-stricken and gripped by the fear of a Communist revolution, the administration had become detached from the Great Depression's pandemic poverty and suffering. Because Hoover's administration lost touch with the common man's plight, its actions were inappropriate for the situation. As the agent charged with carrying out Hoover's orders, the Army also fell victim to the backlash.

Lessons Learned

Perhaps the most important lesson of the Bonus March is the need to understand how using force in civil disturbances can affect popular attitudes toward the federal government and the military. Military leaders must have clearly defined, geographically delineated, decisive and attainable objectives before they begin an operation to restore public order. With these objectives in hand, commanders must then determine operational parameters. Without such specificity, mission creep can occur and increase the potential for a loss of popular and political legitimacy.

In an era of uncertainty about the military's future role, the Army can ill-afford to perform poorly in OOTW and fritter away the trust it currently enjoys. The Army must understand its history, monitor popular perceptions of military force and ensure that today's force is properly trained, equipped and commanded. Readiness includes the ability to support civil authorities in times of crisis without sacrificing the American people's respect. ***MR***

NOTES

1. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol 1, *1880-1941*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 384.
2. David A. Shannon, *Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 110; US Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1933* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933).
3. Herbert Hoover, veto message quoted in Roger Daniels, *The Bonus March: An Episode in the Great Depression* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 46.
4. This number represents the total number of veterans, wives and children in Washington in July 1932.
5. James, 393.
6. James, 391-92.
7. Daniels, 87-122; James, 389.
8. James, 397; Daniels, 296. A copy of Patrick Hurley's order was also reprinted in *The New York Times*, 29 July 1932.
9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967) retold in James, 401.
10. Daniels, 157-81; James, 395-405; Douglas MacArthur, "Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War on the Employment of Federal Troops in Civil Disturbance in the District of Columbia July 29-30, 1932," in Daniels, 291-307.
12. James, 403.
13. See for example, *The New York Times*, 30 July 1932, A4.
14. Hoover, "Text of Hoover's Statement on Calling for Troops to Put an End to Bonus Rioting in the Capital," *The New York Times*, 29 July 1932, Al.
15. See also James, 404-06.
16. Ibid., 407.
17. Ibid.
18. For a concise history of the use of the Army to end civil disorder, see Bennett Milton Rich, *The Presidents and Civil Disorder* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1941).
19. "Cavalry Major Evicts Veteran Who Saved His Life in Battle," *The New York Times*, 30 July 1932, A4.
20. MacArthur's relief by President Harry S. Truman represents an even larger stain on the Army's collective image than the Bonus March. This incident has recently been used by historians Russell Weigley and Richard Kohn to criticize the actions of senior military officers with respect to the Clinton Administration. For serving Army officers sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United States, the reference to MacArthur was an unjustified indictment and has been particularly injurious to their professional pride. See Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 57, no. 5 (Special Issue) (October 1993), 27-58; and Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* (Spring 1994), 3-17.
21. Ibid., 409.
22. All of the OOTW principles outlined in FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) are evaluated except "perseverance." The incident was over so quickly neither the Army's nor the people's will were tested. The people exhibited their frustration with the continued national Depression when they elected Franklin D. Roosevelt president in November 1932.

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Battle Command: Bradley and Ridgway in the Battle of the Bulge

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Jordan, US Army

In recognizing that the operational level of war provides the vital linkage between national and theater strategic direction and the tactical employment of forces, current Army doctrine identifies several key planning tasks for operational-level commanders:

- Shape the military environment.
- Set the conditions for decisive results or victory.
- Identify the military operations that will achieve the desired military end state.
- Support the campaign with operational intents, concepts and objectives.
- Respond to continually changing conditions.[1]

These tasks constitute "the art of motivating and directing soldiers and their leaders into action to accomplish missions."[2]

Aside from planning responsibilities, how do corps or higher commanders affect the tactical level? What role do they play, and how much difference do they make in tactical battles?

In late 1944, US Army General Omar Bradley, commander of the largest Army Group in the European Theater, noticed a weakening of the vaunted German war machine. US Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower's broad-front ground and strategic air campaign was working. Despite devastating Allied losses during the bitter Huertgen Forest fighting, Bradley and other senior commanders believed the Germans were reeling from the repeated Allied Russian hammering. In losing the equivalent manpower of five divisions a week, German defenses were stretched to the breaking point. By late fall, the intelligence community and Bradley, Eisenhower and English General Bernard Montgomery believed the Germans lacked the capabilities to conduct anything beyond local counterattacks. In the Allies' view, the German breaking point was imminent.[3]

As winter approached, Bradley agreed with Eisenhower's decision to maintain pressure on Adolph Hitler's beleaguered *Wehrmacht*.[4] However, the iron laws of logistics combined with limited infantry replacements forced Bradley's planners to economize in order to build up sufficient combat power to sustain an offensive.[5] With Eisenhower's concurrence, Bradley made the "calculated risk" to use the 88-mile Ardennes Forest sector as a reconstitution and training ground for First Army's tired, green divisions.[6]

Bradley relied heavily on British ULTRA intelligence intercepts to confirm his predisposed attitude regarding the German offensive threat. He believed the combat power he would gain through the disposition of forces in the Ardennes was worth the risk.[7] Reasoning that nothing of strategic value lay in the region, Bradley convinced US Army Lieutenant General Troy Middleton, VIII Corps commander, that even if the Germans did attack, the Allies' mobility advantage would enable a rapid defeat of any penetration.[8]

At a 7 December 1944 strategic planning conference with Eisenhower in Maastricht, Netherlands, Bradley received permission to conduct limited offensives using the First and Third Armies.[9] Designed to set the conditions for a major offensive aimed at the heart of Germany by early 1945, these operations fulfilled Eisenhower's desire to destroy the German Army and bring the war to an end.[10]

In early December, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, was not thinking about a possible German offensive through the Ardennes. With his headquarters split between England and France, Ridgway's first concern was to refit and train soldiers to replace the high number of casualties his two crack divisions, the 82d and 101st, had sustained in the ill-fated Arnhem Campaign.[11]

The Assault

On 16 December 1944, the German Army for the third time in 30 years launched a major ground assault through the Ardennes' forested trails. Focusing on Antwerp as his strategic objective, Hitler planned to encircle and destroy Allied forces north of the line of Bastogne-Brussels and Antwerp.[12] Beginning with a thunderous 30-minute artillery preparation along the attack zone, three German armies began the attack against unsuspecting Allied forces.[13]

Although initially shocked, US troops fought back stubbornly to check the massive German assault. All along the front, German units failed to meet their initial assault objectives and time lines. Major exceptions were multiple penetrations along the US VIII Corps front, the most serious occurring between V and VIII Corps in the Losheim Gap.[14]

Bradley was slow to grasp the enormity of the German attack. For almost a day, he believed that German Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt, the senior German commander in the West, had merely launched a spoiling attack to throw off US Army General George S. Patton's offensive in the Saar region.[15] Bradley later commented: "The other fellow knows that if he's to hold out much longer he must lighten the pressure that Patton has built up against him in the Saar. If by coming through the Ardennes he can force us to pull Patton's troops out of the Saar and throw them against his counteroffensive, he will get what he's after. And that's just a

US Army

LTG Matthew B. Ridgway and MG James M. Gavin confer near Werbomont, Belgium.

little more time."[16]

The Defense

Eisenhower did not agree with Bradley's assessment.[17] After a tense night sifting through confusing situation reports, the two officers decided on the immediate defensive strategy—hold the north and south shoulders of the penetration, block the rush west by holding the road hubs of St. Vith and Bastogne and prepare strong defenses along the Meuse River.[18]

Eisenhower instructed Bradley to send the 10th Armored Division from the south and the 7th Armored Division from the north toward the flanks of the attack.[19] Bradley was to alert his commanders to free up any reserves for use in the Ardennes area. Finally, Eisenhower decided to commit the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) reserve, Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps, minus the 17th Airborne Division, to bolster the critical points at St. Vith and Bastogne.[20]

By dawn the next morning Ridgway was on his way to link up with the 82d and 101st, establishing his forward command post at Werbomont. He coordinated with US Army Major General James Gavin, commander of the 82d Airborne Division, met with US Army General Courtney Hodges, commander of First Army, then began directing units to the front lines.[21]

Ridgway's actions were primarily limited to moving troops to penetration points, sizing up the tactical situation and establishing a cohesive defense. By 20 December, his force had grown considerably. Elements included the 30th Infantry Division, major elements of the 3d Armored Division and all the forces in St. Vith, including remnants of several other divisions.[22]

Command Styles

Although he was a corps commander, Ridgway believed a leader's place on the battlefield was forward. Unconcerned that his XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters staff had never before been in combat, Ridgway immediately delegated many duties to his chief of staff and spent most of his time moving around the battlefield. He believed being forward with the troops enabled unit commanders to know him and his thinking. He felt this helped him listen to problems, sense what the troops were up against and interact with small-unit leaders.[23] Finally, and perhaps more significant, he felt he could better assess his subordinate leaders' actions while under extreme conditions.

While Ridgway was involved from the onset in shaping the battle, Bradley took a standoff approach. At a critical planning conference at Verdun on 19 December, he "mostly observed . . . saying little and offering nothing."[24] His stubborn refusal to relocate his forward command post from Luxembourg to a more central location limited him to telephone communication. Despite the situation's seriousness, he did not visit front-line units and commanders.[25]

Bradley's puzzling behavior did not go unnoticed by Eisenhower. With German penetrations threatening to sever key communication nodes, Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff began to have reservations about Bradley's capacity to command and control the actions of the First, Third and Ninth Armies.[26] A day after the Verdun conference, Eisenhower acted on his misgivings. He counterattacked with the Third Army while continuing the defense. He gave Montgomery command of the First and Ninth Armies.[27] Bradley was reduced to being an interested spectator at the battle's most critical time.[28] Patton's Third Army required little assistance from Bradley, and Montgomery and the 12th Army Group staff were responsible for coordinating the defense against the German attack.[29]

After deploying the 82d Division, the newly attached 30th Infantry Division and major elements of the 3d Armored Division, by the evening of 20 December, Ridgway was able to establish a thin but viable defense along the northern shoulder and in front of the Sixth Panzer Army as it aimed for the Meuse River.[30] With their sector spanning from 25 to 85 miles, Ridgway's forces engaged three German Corps.[31]

At St. Vith, the situation was worsening as thrown-together, outnumbered US forces desperately battled the Germans. By 21-22 December, the situation in St. Vith had become critical.[32] Despite the troops'

gallant efforts, the Germans were prevailing. Concluding that a continued defense was hopeless and realizing the difficulty of executing a withdrawal under pressure, Ridgway made his way forward for a personal assessment.[33]

He was not pleased. Major General Alan Jones, commander of the 106th Division, was located to the rear and largely had relinquished his role. Ridgway immediately relieved Jones and put the troops under the 7th Armored Division's command.[34]

Over the next few days, Ridgway continued to deal with critical situations through up-front leadership. Ridgway's forces repeatedly repulsed the attackers despite their advantages in numbers of troops and superior equipment. On Christmas Day, even as he reassured Montgomery and Hodges his lines would hold, the Germans achieved a penetration.[35] Ridgway quickly convinced the Army commander to release his reserve. Within 24 hours he counterattacked and regained the lost ground.[36] By 26 December, Ridgway's efforts paid off. The German attack in his sector came to a halt.

Lessons Learned

What can we learn about the operational commander's impact at the tactical level? As the 12th Army Group commander of 31 divisions, Bradley was in a far better position to influence operations and maneuver than was Ridgway, who was a new corps commander trying to refit and train a force in theater reserve. However, Bradley played a minor role and actually contributed little to the battle's outcome; Ridgway contributed a great deal.

In their book *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch identify three basic sorts of military-operations failures: failure to anticipate, failure to learn and failure to adapt.[37] Failure to anticipate is the inability to foresee and take appropriate measures to deal with a problem. Failure to learn suggests an inability to gain understanding and experience. Failure to adapt is the inability to react or cope with unfolding events. Given the far-reaching impact of mistakes at the operational level, one can easily see how consequences can be amplified.

Bradley's 12th Army Group's inability to correctly assess German preparations, intentions and capabilities before the Ardennes offensive illustrates a failure to anticipate.[38] While Bradley was not the only senior commander surprised by the strength of the German attack, he was clueless as to the enemy's true intentions. In a brutally candid personal assessment, Bradley later wrote: "In the face of this astonishing German buildup, I had greatly underestimated the enemy's offensive capabilities. . . . We could not believe he possessed sufficient resources for a strategic offensive."[39]

Bradley's failure to anticipate German intentions undermined his decision-making apparatus. This led to his risky disposition of forces in the Ardennes, contributed to his reluctance to form an uncommitted Army Group reserve and was why he did not publish and distribute contingency plans.[40] Convinced that the Ardennes had no strategic value, Bradley believed the Germans would not use the route as an operational avenue of approach. He also believed a major offensive would exceed German capabilities. By design, he limited his own flexibility.

In retrospect, Bradley was more right than wrong in regard to German capabilities. However, his decision to take risks without developing adequate contingency plans tremendously strained the rickety scaffolding of his decision-making structure and set conditions the Germans could exploit.

Bradley was also slow to adapt. Once the attack began, he failed to recognize the signs of a major offensive. Had Eisenhower not committed the 7th and 10th Armored Divisions, the defenders of St. Vith or Bastogne hardly could have contained the German push.

As the battle progressed, Bradley's influence increasingly waned. The record is silent about his contributions at the critical 19 December Verdun meeting. It seems he relied on Patton and Eisenhower to determine the Third Army's role. Following the similar pattern of battle command he demonstrated in the disastrous Huertgen Campaign, Bradley did not visit his commanders or view the fighting from a more forward location. However peculiar it might seem in light of his otherwise impeccable military credentials, Bradley's battle command before and during the Battle of the Bulge is wanting. The Bulge was not Bradley's finest hour.[41]

In contrast, Ridgway's practice of battle command helped him play a significant role during the bulge. He organized what became an extremely successful defense against the German Sixth Panzer Army's main effort. Throughout the XVIII Airborne Corps sector, Ridgway's tough command style and forward presence helped stiffen the resolve of unsteady troops and commanders. His uncompromising, aggressive defense not only prevented a rout, it also provided the fulcrum for Patton's counterattack and the following counteroffensive. In retrospect, Eisenhower's decision to deploy his strategic reserve early in the struggle was correct. One can only wonder what the outcome would have been had Ridgway and the soldiers of the XVIII Airborne Corps not been committed to the struggle.

While campaigns are primarily won or lost at the tactical level, operational-level leaders' plans and decisions create the conditions for tactical success or failure. Operational commanders exert considerable influence on the moral domain of combat through personal example, leadership and more significant, by making correct decisions based on a realistic view of the battlefield.

Bradley's acceptance of projected enemy capabilities and his failure to develop flexible reserves and contingency plans established conditions for disaster. His reluctance to adapt could have resulted in collapse had Eisenhower not stepped in. By overruling Bradley's desire to continue with the planned offensive, Eisenhower narrowly averted a debacle. He sent two armored divisions to

shore up the penetration and committed Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps to the theater. Once the defense was established, Eisenhower counterattacked with Patton's Third Army. Ridgway's personal influence and tactical skill helped galvanize US response and stiffened a disintegrating situation. Although the overall victory in the Bulge was because of the fighting spirit of thousands of gallant soldiers, clearly Eisenhower and Ridgway played their parts superbly.

Implications

This study suggests at least three implications for leaders. Although emerging technologies hold great promise, they cannot completely lift the fog of war to reveal everything we need to know about a potential enemy. Despite the Allies' overwhelming advantage from ULTRA intelligence, the Germans' ability to limit electronic signal traffic and their excellent deception effort proved to be low-tech combat multipliers that helped them conduct successfully a major attack that many believed exceeded their capabilities.

Despite technological improvements, strategic surprise is and always will be possible. Future antagonists will find countermeasures and asymmetric means to circumvent conventional and technological superiority.[42] Skillful staff planning helped the Germans conduct an offensive during a weather pattern that grounded the US forces' tremendous air capability. By keenly studying the Allied order of battle and force dispositions, the Germans selected the weakest point along a front hundreds of miles long. Failing to expect no less from future opponents invites disaster.

The allure of emerging technology increasingly entices commanders at all levels to remain in headquarters that offer sophisticated intelligence and communications links. Over time, this practice could degrade the time-honored forward battle command style Ridgway exemplified. We ignore this rudimentary lesson at our own peril.[43]

Commanders who tether themselves to a command post run the risk of developing a distorted view of the battlefield and of disrupting the dialogue and interaction that allow subordinate commanders' perspectives to surface.[44] This loss could lead senior commanders to resurrect the dangerous practice of bypassing echelons of command and issuing instructions directly to subordinates several echelons below. While the convenience of a rearward command post might offer a commander greater communication capabilities, it precludes his capacity to influence soldiers and officers in the most important aspect of all—the moral domain.

While technology might provide a clearer battle picture than ever before, it cannot convey a soldier's feelings of battle. Future leaders will be well served to recall Patton's admonishment that "wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. . . . It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains the victory."[45] As long as warfare continues, effective battle command must include a perspective from the front. ***MR***

NOTES

1. See US Army Field Manual (FM) Army, 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), May 1995), chapters 1-4, for a discussion of operational-level planning responsibilities.
2. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 2-14.
3. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 349-53; see also Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951), 434; Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993), 57-63; Assistant Chief of Staff BG Edwin Sibert, G2 Headquarters, XII Army Group, *Weekly Intelligence Summary N18*, 12 December 1944, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
4. Bradley, 434; see also Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 340.
5. Bradley, 447.
6. Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 552; Bradley, 437-38.
7. Bradley and Blair, 352-53; see also F.W. Winterbotham, *The ULTRA Secret* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 178-79; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 340-41. To Eisenhower's credit, he took responsibility for maintaining only divisions on the Ardennes front in spite of the risk of a large German penetration.
8. Bradley, 454-55.
9. Cole, 53.
10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 338; Bradley, 434.
11. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper, 1956), 111.
12. Cole, 27-28.
13. Danny S. Parker, *Battle of the Bulge: Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944-1945* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1991), 67-82.
14. Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945* (Bloomington: IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 457.
15. Bradley, 455-56.
16. Ibid., 455.
17. John S.D. Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods* (New York: Putnam, 1969), 215.
18. Bradley, 357.
19. Ambrose, 556.
20. Ridgway, 112; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 345-49.
21. Clay Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II* (Garden City, NY: Dial Press, 1985), 432-33; Weigley, 481.
22. Blair, 435-41.
23. Ridgway, 118-19.
24. David Eisenhower, *Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 569-70.
25. Bradley, 357; see also J.D. Morelock, *Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 128-29; Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 682. Before losing command, Bradley had not visited either of his commanders. Patton visited seven divisions and regrouped an army.
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 355; Weigley, 503.
27. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,* vol IV: *The War Years* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 2,371-72.
28. D'Este, 683.
29. See Martin Blumenson, ed, *The Patton Papers, vol 2: 1949-1945* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972-74), 600-08.
30. Blair, 441.
31. Cole, 400-01.
32. Cole, 371.
33. Ridgway, 119.
34. Ridgway, 120-21.
35. Weigley, 532-33.
36. Blair, 472-73.
37. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 26.
38. Sibert, N9.
39. Bradley, 459-60.
40. Bradley, 464. Bradley viewed the Germans as a badly beaten enemy and believed he could not conscientiously withhold in reserve divisions better used on the offensive.
41. See Morelock, 128-29; Chandler, 2,238. In a 14 January 1945 cable to General George C. Marshall, Eisenhower again recommended Bradley for promotion and called his leadership through the Ardennes affair "admirable."
42. See Robert J. Bunker, "Five-Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?" Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998.
43. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 165-67. According to a senior British officer, a growing problem in the US Army was that not even battalion commanders went to the front, which resulted in senior officers and their staffs not knowing what they were ordering their companies to do.
44. See Tom Clancy and General Frederick Franks, *Into the Storm* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1997), 293-95, for an example of the contrasting views between a senior commander tethered to a rear command post and one who operates forward; see also Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take A Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 455-63; Franks, "Battle Command: A Commander's Perspective," *Military Review*, May-June 1996, 4-25. Franks indicates that in the Gulf War he received 20 percent of his information during the battle from command post input, 50 percent from being up front on the battlefield and through his commanders' assessments and 30 percent from embedded memory and training.
45. Blumenson.

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The Marshall Mission:
A Peacekeeping Mission that Failed
by Andrew Birtle

Peacekeeping has recently become a central role for the US Army, but it is not a new mission. Fifty years ago, the Army conducted a truce-enforcement effort in China and still feels repercussions from that failed effort. The Marshall Mission story illustrates the challenges and perils inherent in peacekeeping operations.

China

China was a broken nation at the end of World War II. Its long travail had begun in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party launched a campaign to exterminate Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chiang gained the upper hand in the long, bitter conflict, but the 1937 Japanese invasion compelled him to join Mao in an uneasy alliance. For seven years, Chiang and Mao fought the Japanese—and occasionally each other—mindful that some day they would again square off in the struggle to decide China's destiny. That day came on 2 September 1945, when Japan formally surrendered.

Japan's withdrawal created a vacuum in northern and eastern China. Chiang and Mao rushed to position their forces for the inevitable struggle. Mao's northwestern-based forces were better situated to exploit Japan's withdrawal than were Chiang's armies in southcentral China. Moreover, the CCP had operated guerrilla forces behind Japanese lines for years. As Chiang sent his armies northward, CCP guerrillas delayed and harassed them.

The United States did what it could to aid Chiang in the "great race," partly because it mistrusted Mao and partly because it wished to forestall the Soviet Union, which had occupied Manchuria in the closing days of the war. Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur designated the Nationalists as the Allies' sole agent for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in China. He supplied US air and naval forces to transport nearly 500,000 Chinese government soldiers to key points in northern and eastern China. In October, the United States deployed approximately 50,000 Marines of the III Amphibious Corps to northern China. Ostensibly undertaken to facilitate the repatriation of Japanese personnel, in reality the deployment was designed to prevent the Soviets or the CCP from occupying key population, transportation and mining centers in northern China before the Nationalists could reach them.

The United States genuinely hoped for peaceful resolution of China's internal strife. Although officially recognizing Chiang's government, the United States realized the regime's severe flaws. Under the KMT, China's government was oppressive, inefficient and corrupt. Many US officials sympathized, at least in principle, with the CCP's call for social, political and economic reform.

The United States desperately wanted a strong, united China to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Far East. A civil war, even if it resulted in a Nationalist victory, threatened to weaken the already battered China and invite Soviet encroachment. Consequently, rather than simply backing Chiang, US foreign policy worked toward China's peaceful reunification. The United States wanted Mao to lay down his arms and persuade Chiang to create a political environment in which all parties could compete through peaceful, democratic processes. To achieve this quixotic goal, US President Harry S. Truman sent recently retired US Army General George C. Marshall to broker peace.[1]

Beijing Executive Headquarters

After Marshall's arrival in China on 20 December 1945, negotiations began through the auspices of the Committee of Three, which consisted of Marshall, Chang Chunchiao (Nationalist) and Zhou Enlai (Communist). The most pressing issue before the Committee was to stop the fighting. On 10 January 1946, Marshall convinced the Chinese to cease hostilities, curtail troop movements and reopen all lines of communications, effective midnight, 13 January.

The Committee of Three assigned the job of implementing the accord to the Beijing Executive Headquarters. Staffed by a roughly equal number of US, KMT and CCP personnel, the headquarters was led by three commissioners—a Nationalist, a Communist and an US diplomat, Walter S. Robertson, who served as chairman. US Army Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade acted as headquarters' director of operations and conduit between the commissioners and a tripartite combined chiefs of staff. The combined chiefs supervised the work of several tripartite groups, which translated the Commissioners' directives into detailed programs before sending them to field teams for implementation.

The field teams had the difficult job of imposing the cease-fire, verifying compliance and investigating and adjudicating alleged violations. Each field team was headed by three officers: American, Nationalist and Communist—the American acting as chairman. The US member was usually a colonel or lieutenant colonel; Chinese representatives ranked from major to general. Each representative had his own interpreter, to ensure that nothing was lost—or added—in translation. The teams, which numbered between 10 and 15 people, included support personnel.[2]

The immediacy of the armistice date meant headquarters had to become operational virtually overnight. The Army moved quickly, and by the end of January the peacekeeping

apparatus was up and running, with a headquarters facility in Beijing and nearly a dozen truce-enforcement teams in the field.

The speed with which the organization was established had several unfortunate consequences. The Committee of Three left the details of how the peacekeeping process would work to the commissioners and their staffs to iron out. This meant headquarters had to implement the truce before all procedural matters had been finalized, raising the prospect that some unresolved issue might subsequently arise.

Another weakness was the type of people assigned to headquarters. Part of the original US Army contingent was drawn from demobilizing units in China, and some were unenthusiastic about their assignment. Others came fresh from wartime duties as advisors to Nationalist military units, which raised questions as to their impartiality. As the operation grew, Marshall procured additional personnel from the United States, expressing a preference for mature officers who could conduct delicate negotiations in an alien environment.

Whether or not they had previously served in China, most soldiers possessed little or no knowledge of Chinese language, culture, history or politics, nor had they received peacekeeping training. Accustomed to command, US soldier-diplomats had to learn the delicate art of negotiation while on the job. Byroade hoped the Americans would make up for what they lacked in diplomatic skills through hard work, goodwill and strong character. Although most Americans assigned to the peacekeeping effort behaved creditably, deficiencies in their training sometimes proved a handicap.

Most of the Chinese so mistrusted one another they had difficulty finding common ground. The situation was exacerbated by both factions' tendency to assign field-team officers to areas from where they had come. Unfortunately, this practice created teams filled with men who were political antagonists and blood enemies. Further, these officers were naturally loyal to former commanders whom they now had to judge. Such sentiments strained the field teams' objectivity, especially when a local commander's interests diverged from those of the national party.

Significant as they were, these problems paled in comparison to the fundamental structural flaws of the peacekeeping apparatus. To promote cooperation and understanding between the two warring parties, the Committee of Three had agreed that everything was to be done on a tripartite basis. Every action was subject to negotiation at five separate levels, from the Committee of Three down to the truce teams in the field, and no measure could be undertaken without unanimous consent.

Such an arrangement would have been exceedingly cumbersome under the best of circumstances. Since neither side trusted the other nor was fully committed to a peaceful resolution, it was disastrous. Committees frequently deadlocked over the most trivial matters. Many issues passed up and down the hierarchy of committees without resolution, only to be abandoned. Nor did a decision by the Committee of Three or the commissioners resolve a matter, for at each subordinate level the Chinese tried to manipulate programs for their partisan benefit. Even in the rare event that everyone agreed on a particular course of action, Chinese field commanders sometimes ignored directives, either on their own authority or with their national leaders' secret approval. Without a central enforcement mechanism, such defiance went undisciplined, because each party was reluctant to sanction itself. Created on the assumption of mutual cooperation, the Executive Headquarters proved to be a perfect instrument for prevarication, obfuscation and delay.

Apparent Success

One of headquarters' first tasks was to decide where to base truce-enforcement teams. Typically, each side proposed sending teams to areas where it was weak, hoping to discourage its opponent from launching offensives there. Both factions opposed stationing observers in areas where they planned to make future territorial gains. It was often difficult to find mutually agreeable locations, so a few teams were stationed in totally inconsequential areas. But, for the most part, teams ended up in areas of strategic importance to both sides.[3]

The teams left Beijing, preceded by US aircraft dropping fliers announcing the cease-fire. Having only rudimentary maps, some teams got lost; others found the towns to which they were assigned no longer existed. Living conditions were primitive; the teams' only links to the outside world were radios and periodic resupply by aircraft. The isolation placed great strains on US team leaders who, because of their partisan Chinese counterparts, often found themselves the only neutral persons in their assigned areas.

The scenes that greeted the teams did not inspire optimism. The Chinese were still fighting in some areas, either because local commanders had not received word of the truce or because they chose to ignore it. Frequently, offensives would have been launched in last-minute attempts to gain as much territory as possible before the truce went into effect.

Since the teams could not be everywhere, a few weeks of frantic shuttling and tedious negotiations preceded some semblance of a cease-fire. Still, by late February 1946, most serious fighting had ended, and some antagonists had even complied with headquarters' directives to withdraw. An uneasy peace ensued. Although both parties seemed willing to give the negotiations a chance, they also welcomed the truce as an opportunity to rest and refit. Commanders who seemed most pleased by the arrival of the field teams were usually the ones who used them as shields to mask their forces' redeployment to more strategic areas.

The test of Chinese intentions came in getting commanders who had seized territory after 13 January to relinquish their ill-gotten gains. This proved exceedingly difficult. Neither side was willing to concede an inch of territory without a fuss, and resolution usually came only after days of exhausting negotiation.

While truce-enforcement teams struggled to maintain the fragile peace, Marshall pressed ahead on the diplomatic front, persuading the Chinese to agree to several new initiatives. In the interest of restoring China's socioeconomic fabric, commanders were to "remove or destroy at once all mines, blockhouses, blockages, fortifications or their military works on and along . . . lines of communications which interfere with the operation of such lines."[4]

To ensure neither side gained undue advantage from the reconstruction, the Committee banned troop movements along restored routes unless specifically authorized by Executive Headquarters; it dispatched eight communications field teams to oversee restoration. Marshall also persuaded Mao to lift sieges of Nationalist-controlled cities. Finally, Marshall persuaded both parties to merge into a single Chinese Army. China's four million soldiers would be disarmed and demobilized—a major step toward restoring peace and economic prosperity. Soldiers remaining under arms were to be recast under US tutelage into an integrated force loyal to the national constitution rather than to any particular party or person. By mid-March, Marshall was so confident of success that he returned to the United States to consult with Truman about reconstruction aid for China.

Marshall's assessment was overly optimistic; his grand achievement—the cease-fire—was fitful at best, constantly marred by minor violations and intransigent behavior. His other achievements were equally illusory. The suspension of Communist blockades proved to be only temporary, and the reality of establishing a common national army quickly bogged down.

Partisan wrangling also derailed efforts to restore lines of communication. The Nationalists controlled most of China's railroads and transportation centers; therefore, any restoration of these vital arteries would disproportionately benefit them no matter how impartial Marshall's motives might have been. Realizing this disparity, the Communists undermined the agreement. When not actively harassing communications lines through guerrilla action, they dragged their feet in removing obstacles and raised endless questions over procedure. They demanded joint custody of railways that were the lifeline of the Nationalist Army, something Chiang naturally refused to do. Conversely, the Nationalists claimed that the Committee's order to destroy military installations along railroads did not apply to their many blockhouses because the blockhouses did not interfere with the operations of those lines, a proposition the CCP found equally preposterous. Consequently, headquarters made little headway in restoring China's communications system.

Clearly, Marshall had made no progress in resolving key political differences between the two parties. Until these core issues were resolved, peace could not be guaranteed. No sooner had Marshall left for Washington than his efforts began to unravel. The immediate catalyst for the disintegration was the Manchurian question.

Manchuria

When Marshall negotiated the cease-fire, the Soviets still controlled Manchuria, so the January accord did not specifically mention it. This oversight proved fatal. The United States assumed the cease-fire applied to all of China. However, the Communists insisted that Manchuria was distinct from China proper and therefore not covered by the January agreements. The Soviet withdrawal created an irresistible vacuum; both Chiang and Mao rushed to possess the region's vast resources. Despite their pledge to return Manchuria to the Chinese government, the Soviets timed their withdrawals for Communist benefit and turned over significant stocks of captured Japanese arms to CCP forces. The United States gave the Nationalists a leg up by ferrying thousands of Nationalists troops into the region. By early March, as the antagonists jockeyed for position, the situation in Manchuria resembled that of northern China several months before.

Marshall had cobbled together an agreement extending headquarters' jurisdiction to Manchuria. However, he returned to the United States before the details had been finalized, and disagreements over technical matters delayed the organization's activation. Meanwhile, fighting continued to escalate. On 15 April, three days before Marshall returned to China, the CCP launched a major effort to overrun Nationalist garrisons in Manchuria before the US transport operation sufficiently reinforced them. Even more disturbing, the fighting spread into China proper, as Nationalist troops sought to clear land approaches to Manchuria. Immediately on his return, Marshall tried to stop the fighting, but his entreaties were ignored. The Nationalists, buoyed by a string of victories, pressed their advantage. Not until 7 June, when the Nationalists had become dangerously overextended and the Communists were sufficiently chastened, did the two parties consent to a truce in Manchuria.

The Executive Headquarters established a semiautonomous branch called the Advance Section in Changchun, Manchuria, to implement the accord. It was a streamlined version of the Beijing Headquarters and had eight truce-enforcement teams. The teams succeeded in ending most of the serious fighting but were less successful at returning truce violators to their 7 June positions. With the addition of Manchuria, headquarters operated 36 teams over 1 million square miles. Seriously overstretched, it had little chance of maintaining peace without the goodwill of both parties.

Descent into Civil War

The Manchurian cease-fire was Marshall's last notable accomplishment in China. Despite strenuous efforts, he was unable to resolve the difficult social and political issues dividing the two parties. Both sides increasingly let their guns speak for them. On the day the cease-fire went into effect in Manchuria, Mao launched a major offensive in Shantung province. Chiang responded with a series of highly successful offensives, but each Nationalist victory put another nail in the peace process's coffin. The Nationalists became more cocky; the communists more obstinate.

Each new cease-fire violation damaged the prestige and effectiveness of Marshall and the Executive Headquarters. By June, most tripartite meetings had become little more than verbal brawls. Accusations, counteraccusations and histrionic diatribes followed each other. The dialectically trained Communists were particularly adept at verbal combat, though the Nationalists were no strangers to sophistry. Both succeeded in frustrating the Americans and knotting the peacekeeping machinery. Although the US members went through the motions of drawing up plans, making proposals and holding meetings, progress toward restoring China's communications infrastructure, reorganizing its military forces and enforcing the truce ground to a halt. The only headquarters activity that proceeded unabated was the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from China—the one thing on which all could agree.

In midsummer, the United States made a final effort to prevent full-scale civil war; it imposed an embargo on the shipment of military goods to the Chinese government. The Communists complained that the United States continued to sell "non-lethal" commodities to the Nationalists. The Nationalists, smelling victory, disregarded the embargo and continued their offensives so the embargo weakened the CCP without affecting the KMT.

In June, US and KMT negotiators proposed that the United States be given a deciding vote in all deliberations. This arrangement would have revitalized the peace process by transforming the US role from one of mediation to arbitration. The Communists balked at extending such extraordinary power to the Americans, and the proposal died. Instead, the three parties issued directives demanding compliance with headquarters edicts and threatening punishment for violators. More often than not, these declarations proved meaningless.

As the conflict escalated, US peacekeepers became increasingly frustrated, not only because Chinese obstinacy prevented progress, but because both parties blamed the United States for peacekeeping failures. The Communists were especially culpable, launching a propaganda campaign against the United States that further strained US objectivity. Tempers flared and several truce teams became dysfunctional.

Frayed emotions were not the only hazards of peacekeeping duty. Communist soldiers and civilians became increasingly hostile. United States aircraft bearing supplies for truce teams were occasionally fired on, as were the US Marines guarding north China's railways. In July, CCP troops imprisoned seven Marines who had "invaded" Communist-controlled territory while searching for ice to chill their beer. No sooner had headquarters procured their release than 300 communist troops ambushed a Marine convoy near An Ping. The four-hour battle left three Marines dead and 11 wounded—one mortally. Marshall was outraged by the attack and by the Communists' allegation that the battle resulted from a joint US-KMT assault on An Ping. The Communists also detained several US peacekeepers on charges of espionage.

By September, matters had deteriorated so much that headquarters withdrew 11 truce-enforcement teams for safety reasons. Of the remaining 17 teams only four were fully functional. The United States tried to circumvent these problems by getting both parties to agree to bipartite field teams. Each bipartite team would consist of one US and one Chinese representative—a Nationalist in Nationalist-controlled areas and a Communist in Communist areas. The teams were to limit their activities to observation and reporting, leaving the task of adjudication to headquarters personnel. This system had several advantages; it eliminated internecine struggles within the teams and spared them from having to cross front lines, an increasingly risky action. It had the added benefit of preventing the Chinese from using the teams to spy on one another's activities, something both parties did frequently.

The bipartite system proved no more successful than the old one; it came too late. In November, Chiang destroyed any chance for a peaceful settlement when he unilaterally called together China's long-dormant National Assembly to ratify a new constitution without Communist participation. The Communists regarded this action as a virtual declaration of war, and Zhou departed from the Committee of Three, declaring that the Committee and Executive Headquarters had outlived their usefulness. Walter Robertson, the US Commissioner at the Executive Headquarters, apparently agreed, for he had resigned in frustration the month before. Reluctant to concede defeat, Marshall remained in China for a few more weeks. Finally, on 8 January 1947, Marshall left China to become US Secretary of State. The officers and men of the peacekeeping apparatus soldiered on until 6 February 1947, when the US section of the Beijing Executive Headquarters officially closed. The experiment in truce enforcement had failed, and the Chinese Civil War—a war that Mao would eventually win—began in earnest.

In Retrospect

Many factors contributed to the failure of truce enforcement. United States Army personnel were unprepared for their duties; their Chinese counterparts showed little enthusiasm for their work. The hastily assembled headquarters had not resolved important matters of policy and procedure before it was established. The multilayered structure of tripartite committees—each requiring unanimous consent—and the absence of any prearranged system of sanctions made it virtually impossible for headquarters to implement mandates. In Marshall's estimation, these flaws created "insurmountable, maddening obstacles [that] the superb courage of the officers of our Army and Marines" were unable to overcome.[5]

Although it was probably true the Chinese people longed for peace, their destiny lay in the hands of opposing political elites bent on each other's destruction. What ultimately killed the peace effort, Marshall noted, was the factions' "complete, almost overwhelming" suspicion of one another, a suspicion that neither

he nor anyone else could readily overcome.[6]

Although it appears trite, the fundamental lesson of the Marshall Mission is that one cannot compel two parties bent on destroying one another to make peace. Before embarking on a peacekeeping operation, policymakers must ascertain through cold, hard analysis whether conflicting parties are genuinely committed to peacefully resolving their differences. If they are not, then peacekeeping efforts, no matter how well organized or executed, will fail. ***MR***

NOTES

1. A. Dee Willis, "Peiping Executive Headquarters, 1946-47," Senior thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1970, 22.
2. Wesley Wilson, "The United States Army's Contribution to the Marshall Mission in China, 1 January 1946 to 1 March 1947," M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1957, 30. Wilson was a member of the Executive Headquarters.
3. "Operations Report, The Executive Headquarters, Peiping, China, 1946-47, Section I, The United States Branch," 5, Record Group 319, P&O, 091 China, box 62.
4. Willis, 126.
5. Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-49* (New York: Viking, 1987), 142.
6. Wilson, 90-91.

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MR Conference Report

Non-Lethal Weapons Conferences

by Robert J. Bunker

Several worldwide conferences are or have been considering the future of non-lethal weapons (NLW). NLW proliferation and practicality continue to offer intriguing possibilities for "bloodless" warfare.

The NDLA Conference

The National Defense Industrial Association's Non-Lethal Defense III Conference was held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland, in February 1998. Several themes emerged. For example, NLW are now generally recognized for utility in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), which principally occur in failed- and failing-state environments. NLW proved their worth in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia, offering US soldiers options between applying lethal force or none. NLW will become increasingly important in rapidly changing security environments where anarchy and societal warfare occur and where nonstate groups actively challenge the legitimate political authority of nation-states.

Some military and law-enforcement groups are interested in "rheostatic" or tunable weapons that can be made lethal or non-lethal by pushing a button or turning a dial. If a stability and support operation (SASO) devolves into a shooting conflict, lethal force could still be used almost immediately. Another promising system demonstrated at the conference was the "Laser Dazzler," a dual-technology device for both military and law-enforcement use.[1] Resembling a slightly oversized flashlight, its eye-safe laser produces an intense beam of green light programmed to create a "strobe" effect. The device could be used to project an "optical wall" beyond 50 meters as a defensive cybershield in front of US forces in MOUT or SASO. Such a wall would turn away most individuals or provide an extra time cushion for US forces.

The publication *Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1997—A Year in Review* candidly discusses the Joint NLW Directorate's progress during its first year.[2] A joint, nonlethal weapons CD ROM database and a bimonthly newsletter also support the NLW community. For information, call 703-784-1997 or visit <http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/>.[3]

A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons, a paper read at the conference, directly supports the operational concept in *Joint Vision 2010* based on the need for full-dimensional protection. This document specifies that NLW should leverage high technology, enhance operations, augment deadly force, provide rheostatic capability, focus on tactical applications, facilitate expeditionary operations, maintain policy acceptability, provide reversibility in counterpersonnel effects and apply across the range of military operations. Core capabilities are based on a counterpersonnel and countermateriel focus. The document also has an annex that contains scenarios for NLW employment. The paper can be accessed at the Joint NLW Program web site.[4]

A number of representatives from the new Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, Applied Research Lab, Pennsylvania State University, attended this conference. The Joint NLW Program has established a relationship with the Institute. The group's goal is to establish evaluation criteria and standards for NLW testing. Such criteria are important because no definition of "incapacitation" or other terms currently exists. The Institute can be reached at 814-865-3911 or E-mail <rrm11@psu.edu>.[5]

Conference proceedings can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center's web site at <www.dtic.mil/stinet/ndia/nld3.html>.[6] This conference series traditionally occurs every other year. Non-Lethal Defense Conference IV

will meet on 21-22 March 2000, in Tysons Corner, Virginia.

Jane's Information Group Conference

The Jane's Information Group Conference on "Fielding Non-Lethal Weapons in the New Millennium" was held in London, 1-2 November 1999.[7] Several discussions centered on the paradigm shift in US enemies. Nonstate actors such as political and religious factions or terrorists were viewed as viable, modern-day threats. When nonstate forces are armed with weapons of mass destruction, conventional military tactics will be less effective against them. As a result, NLW will be critical in any struggle.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has initiated the "SirUS (or SIrUS) Project," which attempts to define the legal phrase "superfluous or unnecessary suffering" in regard to weapons.[8] This project concerns NLW by attempting to mandate which weapons Western governments can or cannot use. While this is a well-intentioned nongovernment initiative, legal reviews of these weapons already occur, so this project represents a redundant and potentially burdensome development in fielding NLW.

One study casts doubt on using acoustics as NLW. Specifically, the alleged effects of infrasound and strong-sound were questioned because they contradicted scientific evidence obtained in a detailed study supported by the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University; the MacArthur Foundation; and the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany.[9] If this study is accurate, then acoustic weapons are not currently viable.

Two forms of NLW-targeting schemes were discussed. The first concerned "functions targeting." Macro-level function targeting focuses on the enemy's processes: command and control, communications, analysis, everything necessary to build, transport or employ a weapon system. Function targeting centers on the ability to intrude, interfere, deceive, disrupt, delay, deny, disorient, incapacitate, simulate and manipulate the enemy. The second form concerned "bond-relationship targeting," focusing on degrading, severing and altering the bonds or relationships that allow an enemy to conduct war. Disrupting an enemy and sending him into chaos is the desired end state.

NLW sets, fielded by the US Marine Corps, provide a 200-man company with equipment and four categories of munitions: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission enhancers and ammunition. All weapons are acceptable from legal, ethical and political perspectives. They produce reversible effects against personnel, are expeditionary and provide options in situations where lethal force might not be appropriate. These weapons are to augment lethal force, not replace it.

The question of a "silver bullet" antipersonnel NLW was discussed. If one were to exist, it would be based on nerve stimulation using electrical impulses. The weapon would cause little or no physical trauma and would affect the largest human target—touch—derived from the skin organ with 21 square feet of receptor surface. The holdup on development is not the nerve-stimulation effects but the delivery to the target. Some form of electromagnetic carrier beam would be the most efficient means of impulse-disruption delivery.

Current US military missions encounter three force models: traditional warfighting, military operations other than war and law enforcement. Facing terrorists is best done using the traditional military force model when generating rules of engagement.

Miscellaneous discussion topics included the nature of future conflicts, operational requirements, science and technology and culture and law. Also discussed were the criminalization of national governments, the ambiguous nature of conflicts, the proliferation of NLW technology and the need to revise international law.

Conference Conclusions

While nongovernment operations raise important issues, inflexible or dogmatic interpretation of international law is counterproductive, as are unrealistic perceptions of future warfighting. For example, attendees readily advocated the use of lethal force against combatants hiding behind "human shields," rather than using NLW, which would temporarily incapacitate innocents and combatants alike so combatants could subsequently be captured.

The argument that some states might misuse NLW and, therefore, such weapons should be banned, is not persuasive. Following this logic, car batteries should be outlawed because they can be used for torture. Non-lethal weapons represent new forms of weaponry, like the crossbow and firearm before them, which will continue to proliferate and evolve. Any attempt to ban them, especially directed-energy devices, will ultimately fail. Military forces who do not master these weapons and develop the proper force structures and concepts to use them will find themselves ineffective and irrelevant in future conflicts. ***MR***

NOTES

1. For more information, visit LE Systems, Inc., Glastonbury, CT, at <www.laurin.com/Directory/LPHTML/nal/13489600.htm>.
2. NLW Directorate, *Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1997—A Year in Review*, February 1998.
3. US Department of Defense, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, <http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/>, updated 20 October 1999.
4. Ibid.
5. Note: To access this E-mail address, be sure to use the numeral "one", not the letter "ell."
6. US Department of Defense, Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, VA.
7. For information concerning conference transcripts and/or booklets, contact Jane's at <oni.taha@janes.co.uk>.
8. For more information, visit <www.wma.ne/e/press/98_18b.html>.
9. For more information, visit <einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/>.

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MR Book Reviews

CODE-NAME BRIGHT LIGHT: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War by George J. Veith. 320 pages. Free Press, New York. 1998. $25.00.

Code-Name Bright Light addresses the history of the US prisoners of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) intelligence and wartime rescue operations that have remained concealed under the shroud of national security. George J. Veith covers the earliest rescue attempts and the formation of the supposedly centralized Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), a small clandestine detachment organized in 1966 to collect and analyze intelligence reports on captured Americans in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and, if possible, to organize raids to rescue them.

The *Bright Light* story is tragic. Although the JPRC remained in existence for 6 years, it never recovered a single American POW. Veith cites the difficulty in acquiring and acting on timely intelligence; the amorphous nature of the "target," which was essentially a group of prison camps on the move in South Vietnam and Laos; the impediments of weather and terrain; and the reluctance of some commanders to undertake what they viewed as high-risk operations with limited prospects of success. In addition, bureaucratic jealousies, interservice rivalries and limited resources delayed missions that depended on quick response. Consistent ill fortune and "fog and friction" repeatedly doomed operations that to succeed required almost everything to go exactly right. Thus, despite heroic efforts, none of the more than 125 rescue attempts succeeded.

Veith also addresses how the secrecy dictated by the effort to recover POWs led to agonizing conflicts with families of those carried as missing or imprisoned. The families perceived that little or nothing was being done to help their loved ones.



Unable to reveal the extensive operations under way, the government was confronted by an increasingly organized, activist and ultimately, hostile group of families, even though the situation weighed heavily on military leaders like General Harold K. Johnson. Veith concludes: "In essence, the military did their very best to recover American POWs; yet they completely failed." However, the failure was not for lack of the essential qualities of commitment, courage or compassion.

On the critical and inevitable question of whether some prisoners remain "unreturned," Veith stresses the questionable nature of *post facto* testimony, especially that of Laotians and Vietnamese, whose countries endured further turmoil after the JPRC was disbanded in early 1973. An "informal survey" of over 50 JPRC personnel reveals that about half believe some men were left behind in Vietnam. Almost three-fourths of those surveyed believe Americans were still alive in Laos in 1973. However, these results appear to be based more on emotionalism than hard facts.

Veith has assembled an impressive, extensive range of previously unseen material, conducted numerous interviews with key participants, reviewed diaries and correspondence, conducted archival research in many repositories and unearthed some material not previously exploited, including recently declassified National Security Agency (NSA) intercepts, State Department cables and wartime interrogation reports. This is the book's strongpoint. Unfortunately, the book also has serious shortcomings.

Veith's approach is almost episodic and appears to be a compilation of research notes rather than a detailed analysis that relates rescue efforts to the Vietnam War's larger context and connects the JPRC with what was happening elsewhere in the war. Still, the book usefully examines an important topic that had largely been ignored until the late 1990s, partly because it took that long before many relevant documents were declassified. Although his analysis could have been stronger, Veith makes a genuine contribution to the historical understanding of the Vietnam War.

LTC James H. Willbanks,
USA, Retired,
Department of Joint and Multinational Operations,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GENERAL STAND WATIE'S CONFEDERATE INDIANS by Frank Cunningham. 252 pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK. 1998. $14.95.

Originally published in 1959, *General Stand Watie's Confederate Indians* fills an important void in Civil War history. Frank Cunningham's book breaks the stereotype that Confederate soldiers were primarily of European descent. As with the newer works on African American Confederates, Cunningham's book shows that the Confederate cause crossed cultural and ethnic lines and does a reputable job of telling how Cherokee Indian chief Stand Watie became a Confederate general officer

with his Cherokee tribesmen following him from Wilson's Creek, Missouri, to the end of the war in the West.

By portraying the Indian contribution to the Confederate effort, it provides an interesting study of alliances between diverse peoples with the same general goals. The Confederacy's inability to properly support its Indian allies proved to be a weak link in the South's political and military policies.

Cunningham's unbiased description of how Watie and the civilized tribes of Indian territory sided with the same South that had expelled them from their ancestral homelands less than 30 years before is a fascinating study in human nature. Rather than blame Southerners, the Indians directed their animosity toward the Federal government, whose intrusion was as much a continued threat in their lives as it was to Confederate states' rights.

The Confederacy's inability to properly support the Five Civilized Tribes caused major dilemmas for the loyal Cherokees. Already poor in resources, the Indians often went to battle without adequate weapons, hoping to obtain battlefield residue. Watie's Indians loyally supported secession until the end, even though they were ill supplied. Unfortunately, the Indians were not only on the losing side, they were still Indians. Post-war Federal policies treated them doubly harsh.

A gentleman-soldier of great character, Watie stuck by his convictions and fought with tremendous zeal for the Confederacy. Even when declining fortunes of war in the South pointed toward eventual defeat, Watie did not betray his trust. His surrender in June 1865 made him the last Confederate general to cease hostilities. Watie's reputation was undiminished and untarnished, certainly aided by his personal wartime leadership. He returned to his Red River valley home and died in 1871 after his nation had signed another treaty with the US in 1866 guaranteeing the Cherokees minimal autonomy.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr.,
USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas

VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. 487 pages. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1999. $30.00.

The Cold War was as aggressive as any hot war, and the stakes were just as great. *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* analyzes Soviet Communist Party archives and declassified, deciphered messages of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB).

Venona, a project code word, was a highly classified National Security Agency (NSA) effort to decode cables from diplomats at the Soviet consulate and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.



These cables concerned not diplomacy but espionage. They dealt with the KGB's active recruiting of US communists as spies and conducting background checks with the Communist International. The American Communist Party became an underground network for launching an "unrestrained espionage offensive." The names within the cables became the who's who of exposed spies in western governments, industry and atomic projects.

John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr provide thumbnail sketches of such prominent spies as British Intelligence liaison Kim Philby, a Soviet agent within the British government, and William Weisband, a linguist on the project at Arlington Hall. Others were Klaus Fuch, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Judith Coplon. The authors' research shows how Venona messages reveal Julius Rosenberg's role as the leader of a productive ring of Soviet spies and clears up much of the doubt surrounding the Rosenbergs' guilt. Unfortunately, there are no easy, comprehensive solutions in the world of espionage, and Venona was no different. Many agents in Venona had cover names and could not be identified.

Venona is well-documented and informative. As a former intelligence officer, I would have preferred some of the sources and, particularly, the methods to remain classified. As current headlines reveal, foreign powers still come to America to steal secrets. However, everyone should read the book. It will help dispel foggy conjectures and balance revisionist misrepresentations that have assaulted US efforts in the Cold War.

COL Richard N. Armstrong,
USA, Retired,
Copperas Cove, Texas

STOLEN VALOR: How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History by B.G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley. 692 pages. Verity Press, Inc., Dallas, TX. 1998. $31.95.

Stolen Valor is an angry book. It will upset almost everyone, and it will infuriate the activists and the sympathizers of the old antiwar movement. B.G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley systematically demolish the most fervently believed falsehoods and myths surrounding the Vietnam War. The book will offend broadcast and print journalists, whom Burkett and Whitley severely criticize for repeating and thereby giving credence to absurd atrocity stories that can be disproved easily with minimal investigation; it will also upset soldiers who honorably served their country in Vietnam. On page after page, the authors expose the phonies and the liars who today pass themselves off as decorated Vietnam veterans.

An ordnance officer in the 199th Infantry Brigade from 1968 to 1969, Burkett has been on a one-man crusade for more than 10 years to uncloak the truth about Vietnam and those who served. In the 1980s he spearheaded efforts to establish the Texas Vietnam Veterans' Memorial. During fund-raising efforts, he en-

countered reactions ranging from indifference to outright hostility. Often the response was, "Vietnam veterans! Why should I contribute to those losers?"

Burkett's group persevered, and on 11 November 1989, President George Bush finally dedicated the memorial. After the ceremony, the local press wanted to get reactions from Vietnam veterans, but when Burkett invited reporters to speak with committee members, they declined. They did not want to speak to businessmen in coats and ties; they preferred to talk with the "real" Vietnam veterans in ragged jungle fatigues and "boonie" hats. Burkett wondered just who the "veterans" really were and how many had actually served in Vietnam.

In the following years, Burkett critically evaluated all media reports about Vietnam veterans and their problems. He reviewed scientific, and not-so-scientific, studies that seemed to support popular stereotypes. Slowly and methodically, he amassed overwhelming evidence that contradicted these notions.

In *Stolen Valor*, Burkett and Whitley completely demolish the myths of Vietnam veteran joblessness, homelessness and suicide rates. He presents strong and compelling evidence to disprove the widely held belief that a disproportionate burden of combat service fell on minorities and the poor. Tackling Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Burkett shows that the psychological and readjustment problems of Vietnam veterans were no worse than those of veterans of previous wars. He argues that the Agent Orange problem is vastly overblown. With PTSD and Agent Orange, Burkett challenged head-on two of the Veterans Administration's most sacred cows.

Burkett reserves his special ire for liars and "wannabes." Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain service records, he exposed countless fakes and frauds, ranging from a judge who falsely claimed to be a Medal of Honor winner to rag pickers in ratty fatigues wearing green berets, Silver Stars and Distinguished Service Crosses. He even exposed those still on active duty or in the reserves who have grossly inflated their military records.

Phonies get away with their charade because of a general reluctance to challenge them—no matter how outrageous their stories. Burkett harshly criticizes reporters who write that someone is a decorated Vietnam veteran, or even a former POW, simply because that person says he is.

Pass in Review

THROUGH THE VALLEY: Vietnam, 1967-1968, by James F. Humphries. 335 pages. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO. 1999. $49.95.

Through the Valley details the US Army 196th Light Infantry Brigade's battles and small-unit actions in South Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. Although the book has some excellent first-hand accounts of close combat in Vietnam, one must wade through often-mundane detail to get to them. Following the action is difficult, in part because the names of the soldiers involved in the fighting constantly change, which of course is not the author's fault. The book describes typical Vietnam small-unit actions—soldiers running patrols, walking through rice paddies, wading through creeks and occasionally fighting in terrifying close combat. Unfortunately, this activity does not make the book interesting. Also, the maps do not show enough detail to add clarity. I found it easy to put down. **—MAJ Craig A. Collier, *USA, Fort Shafter, Hawaii***

THE GENERAL AND THE JOURNALISTS: Ulysses S. Grant, Horace Greeley and Charles Dana by Harry J. Maihafer. 320 pages. Brassey's: Washington, DC. 1998. $24.95.

The General and the Journalists explores the relationship between Ulysses S. Grant, Charles Dana and Horace Greeley and how military-media relations shaped Union strategy during the Civil War. Greeley and Dana's stories about Grant's activities in the Western Theater launched him first to command of all Union armies then into the White House. Grant adroitly managed his relationship with the media to improve northern public opinion without compromising operational security. Unfortunately, Maihafer's narrative often hides the importance of military-media relations. The book is a loose biography of Grant, with occasional asides about Greeley and Dana. An analytical treatment of this important and timely subject remains unwritten.—**1LT Richard D. Starnes, *USA, Cullowhee, North Carolina***

DEATH OR GLORY: The Legacy of the Crimean War by Robert B. Edgerton. 288 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1999. $22.50.

Robert B. Edgerton weaves Crimean War events into a cautionary tale. No sound political reasons existed for the war, but ironically, the British public strongly supported it. Its popularity introduced changes in handling the sick and wounded and eventually led to the Red Cross's founding. Overall, however, the war was a sad affair punctuated by poor planning, worse execution and callous indifference to the conditions that surrounded the sick and wounded. Edgerton gives fair treatment to all sides, and the personal accounts are highly interesting and enlightening.**—MAJ William T. Bohne, *US Army, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas***

Reporters also repeat the grotesque and false stories of soldiers routinely killing children and taking ears. Is it any wonder that many Americans believe that war crimes and atrocities were the routine of the US military policy in Vietnam? Such stories reinforce the negative but erroneous stereotypes of the Vietnam veteran in US society today. As Burkett proves in case after case, many "Vietnam veterans" never set foot in Vietnam, and some never served a single day in uniform.

If you served in Vietnam, read this book. It will make you boiling mad. We owe "Jug" Burkett a debt of gratitude for his splendid work. Even if you did not serve in Vietnam, read this book. It is a cautionary tale for the future.

COL David T. Zabecki, *USAR, 7th Army Reserve Command, Heidelberg, Germany*



HOW AMERICA FOUGHT ITS WARS: Military Strategy from the American Revolution to the Civil War by Victor Brooks and Robert Hohwald. 496 pages. Combined Publishing, Consohocken, PA. 1999. $29.95.

In *How America Fought Its Wars*, Victor Brooks and Robert Hohwald announce their intention to produce a "unique combination of battle narratives, campaign analysis and speculative discussion concerning possible alternatives to the events that actually occurred from 1765 to 1865." Since many previous scholars, historians and military analysts have applied all three of these approaches often and at length, it is difficult to find a "unique combination."

Regrettably, Brooks and Hohwald fail to do so. They devote 216 pages of a 496-page book to the American Civil War, surely the most analyzed and discussed single conflict in US history and the subject of thousands of earlier treatments. So, it is no surprise their "narratives, campaign analysis and speculative discussion" of this conflict have been

THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: Four Inquiries by Michael J. Perry. 106 pages. Oxford University Press, New York. 1998. $35.00.

The idea of human rights is a popular 20th-century topic. Michael J. Perry discusses how religion and ethics play into the subject, then asks hard questions. Is it right to kill a terrorist's child to try to force him to disclose where he has hidden a nuclear device in a populated area? His other children would meet the same action if he does not tell. Is it right for one or two innocent children to die to save thousands? Perry has done a service to bring this issue to military leaders' attention for thoughtful discussion. Every officer who might be in a position to decide on human rights should read this book and think through such dilemmas. **—LTC Lynn L. Sims, *USAR, Retired, Richmond, Virginia***

NEVER IN DOUBT: Remembering Iwo Jima edited by Lynn Kessler. 288 pages. The Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1999. $32.95.

Never In Doubt: Remembering Iwo Jima is based on oral history, which has come back into popular use. The book relates first-person accounts of activities or experiences, whether in combat arms, combat medical corpsman, communications, headquarters and wounded. The closing two chapters are especially poignant. Because so many aging World War II and Korean War veterans are now dying, it is very important to capture their experiences for posterity.—**Richard Milligan, *TRADOC Analysis Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

ALLY TO ADVERSARY: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace by Rick Francona. 188 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1999. $27.95.

Air Force intelligence officer and Middle East specialist Rick Francona was the lead field military interpreter during the Gulf War and helped write reports to Congress. He has unique insights, having befriended Iraq officers, who are now on the other side in the peace talks. This excellent, well-written book answers questions about the US relationship with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Francona tells of his experiences with the Saudi Arabians, who did not want US soldiers' waste on Saudi ground and insisted on separating donated Christian and Muslim blood. The book also includes good discussions on chemical-weapon and missile use, social changes in Saudi Arabia, Israel's place in the Arab mind and US Middle East strategy. **—LTC Lynn L. Sims, *USA, Retired, Richmond, Virginia***

covered elsewhere.

In their "alternative strategies and outcomes" for the War of 1812, the authors argue that President James Madison's government could and should have adopted Robert Fulton's scheme to build 20 steam frigates and exploit "a technological breakthrough similar to the introduction of airplanes." The authors are apparently aware, although they never mention it, of the launching of the first US steam frigate, the *Demologas,* late in the war. What they ignore is the doubtful ability of US shipyards to quickly produce numbers of such vessels. Furthermore, despite Fulton's understandable enthusiasm, the *Demologas* proved underpowered and poorly designed as a warship. Not until the development of better engines and the screw propeller were practical steam-propelled fighting ships built.

Other parts of the authors' analyses are similarly shallow. In discussing the American Revolution, they suggest that the "terrible experience" of the Continental Army at Valley Forge was "mythology" since, although "food and clothing were in short supply, temperatures were in the high 30s and low 40s" with "slightly below normal snowfall." This contention is monumentally obtuse. Clearly Brooks and Hohwald have no conception of what it is like to live outdoors with inadequate food and clothing in temperatures only 10 degrees above freezing for a period of months. They seem to have never heard of hypothermia.

The authors also seem to believe that it was a "coincidence" that President Abraham Lincoln's term of office coincided closely with the length of the Civil War. It is fairly obvious to most historians that Lincoln's election was a proximate cause of the war and his assassination an immediate result of the Union victory. No coincidence is involved.

The scholarship behind the book is a mystery. No biographical information is offered on the authors, so it is impossible to judge their academic and professional credentials. At several points they do refer to the vast amount of research and "extensive examination of documents" and their "extensive use of the memoirs of significant leaders." However, at no point do they make any specific reference to any source material or connect it in any direct way with the body of the text. They provide no footnotes, no endnotes or bibliography and only a perfunctory index. This makes it impossible to evaluate the scholarship involved or to judge the value or even the nature of their sources.

In choosing "how America fought its wars" as a subject, the authors are working well-ploughed ground indeed. Since they offer no original accounts, special insights or new methods, and since they demonstrate a wide but shallow grasp of American military history, it is hard to see why the book was written at all.

LTC Thomas K. Adams,
USA, Retired,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania



THE BLACK CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS OF ILLINOIS: The Story of the Twenty-Ninth U.S. Colored Infantry by Edward A. Miller Jr. 267 pages. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC. 1998. $29.95.

American poet Walt Whitman once stated that the interior history of the Civil War soldier would never be told. Though Whitman's assessment is generally true, in *The Black Civil War Soldiers of Illinois*, Edward A. Miller offers an interpretive rapprochement through a new history of the Black 29th US Colored Infantry, a unit formed in Illinois. Yet, this book is not simply a regimental history; it is a deeper study of the lives of Black recruits in the Civil War era and a journey into the hinterlands of American racial pathos.

Throughout this study, Miller explores the biographies of individual soldiers, revealing their often convoluted histories. Miller uncovered interesting and valuable demographic and socioeconomic data during his research, which not only expands our knowledge of the Black soldier but also the culture of the 29th's white officers, whom their fellow Union soldiers often unduly prejudged as incompetent.

The 29th's only substantial combat experience came at the ill-fated Battle of the Crater, Petersburg, Virginia, where the employment of Black regiments was unfairly blamed for battlefield failures. Many in the North pinned the responsibility for the disaster on supposedly inferior Black troops, but Miller's historiography yields a saner assessment through a detailed account of the battle.

At the war's end, instead of disbanding, the 29th was brought up to full strength and marched to Texas to meet a perceived threat from French encroachment into Mexico. Life was "difficult, food shortages common and medical care inadequate"; many died of privation. The men of the 29th performed with proficiency on a par with their white comrades, but national incredulity would persist with attitudes exemplified by "a mix of pity, paternalism, condescension and racial superiority."

Miller notes that 60 percent of the 29th's officers and men filed for pensions. Many claims for compensation based on service-related disabilities were exaggerated or downright fraudulent. No doubt many were motivated by extreme poverty. Regardless, these soldiers had completed their military service with "devotion and competence."

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, *USAF,*
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR QUIZ AND FACT BOOK by Jonathan N. Hall. 272 pages. Taylor Publishing Company, Dallas, TX. 1999. $14.95.

When did John Adams write, "It ought to be solemnized with pomp

and parade, with shows, games, sports, guns, bells, bonfires and illuminations, from one end of the continent to the other, from this time forward, forevermore?" What song did the British Army band play as it marched out of Yorktown, Virginia, to formally surrender on 19 October 1781? Why is the Battle of Saratoga considered the turning point of the war? What battle, fought in South Carolina on 17 January 1781, has been frequently compared to Hannibal's victory over the Romans at Cannae? How many naval vessels did the British have at the start of the war?

Students, teachers, trivia buffs and historians will enjoy Jonathan Hall's 600-plus questions and answers in *The Revolutionary War Quiz and Fact Book* about "the defining event that established the foundation of this country and its rise to greatness." Hall includes questions and answers on pre-Revolutionary War years, the French and Indian War, the interwar years from 1783 to 1811, the War of 1812 and naval facts and actions on the high seas. The work, organized chronologically, covers the period's military, social and political history. There are three appendixes: Revolutionary War battle casualties, War of 1812 battle casualties and a list of ships, naval guns and captains of the Continental Navy. A chronology, bibliography, index and photo credits support the text.

For those still pondering the questions: Congress first voted for Henry Lee's resolution for independence by a vote of 12 for and none against, with New York abstaining, on 2 July 1776. According to legend, the British band played "The World Turned Upside Down." After British Major General John Burgoyne's surrender at the Battle of Saratoga, France decided to enter the war against England. The Battle of Cowpens is frequently compared to Hannibal's victory at Cannae. England began the war as the world's greatest military power with 270 ships in the Royal Navy.

MAJ Glenn E. Gutting,
ARNG,
New Orleans, Louisiana

WITH THE GERMAN GUNS: Four Years on the Western Front, by Herbert Sulzbach. 256 pages. Leo Cooper, London. 1998. First printed in German in 1935. $39.95.

World War I memoirs of the Western Front still have a curious fascination, although almost a century separates us from the horrific events of 1914-1918. Among the millions mobilized to serve in the trenches, hundreds of highly educated men graphically recorded their experiences. Men like Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Ranke Graves, Edmund Blunden, Henri Barbusse and Erich Maria Remarque used realism, irony and grisly detail to blow away any 19th Century illusions of the glory and romance of battle. Their work represented something new in Western literature and something new in the way Western civilization looked at warfare.

Western Front memoirs fall into two groups. The largest and most well known might be called the "innocence meets horrible reality" school. Represented by authors like Sassoon and Remarque, it has an almost prurient appeal. As when watching the replay of a terrible accident, we already know how the story will play out. The idealistic schoolboy marches off with visions of valor and national honor. Soon he is confronted with the futility and carnage of the Western Front. By the book's end, he is doing his best to maintain sanity, having discarded any hatred of the enemy or conceptions of blind patriotism.

The other school, less well represented and of considerably less literary significance, might be called the "new man forged in the crucible of war" school. The school's most conspicuous exemplar is Ernst Juenger. In his famous autobiographical book, *The Storm of Steel* (Howard Fertig, New York, 1996, $13.00), Juenger describes his evolution from an immature youth to a rock-hard storm trooper. He found trench warfare exhilarating, offering the spirit of true comradeship, freedom from the constraints of materialist society and spiritual renewal based on patriotic sacrifice.

At first glance, one might be tempted to put Herbert Sulzbach's *With the German Guns* in the second category of war memoir. Sulzbach spent four years on the Western Front, apparently without wavering in his commitment to the cause of Imperial Germany. He was decorated with the Iron Cross First Class during the Battle of the Somme, commissioned from the ranks and was battalion adjutant by war's end. Throughout the conflict, he celebrated the close friendships built in shared adversity, marveled at the steadfastness of the common soldier and wrote with pride of Germany's powers of resistance against a world of enemies.

In the last month of war, with revolution brewing in Germany, he commented bitterly, "So now, while the people at home have already dropped out of the race, we chaps out here intend to show that the old power of resistance is still alive; and what a contrast there is between all this and what is going on at home." Passages like this caused the Nazi Party to give the book high praise when it appeared in 1935; that is, until the Nazis discovered Sulzbach's Jewish background. Sulzbach was forced to flee his homeland and by 1940 had joined the British Army to fight against the nation he had served so loyally.

This is a highly readable account of a soldier's day-to-day life during

a long and terrible war. In particular, two things are striking: Sulzback's emotional endurance and the sheer "mechanized" horror of *Materialschlacht* in the last months of the war. In July 1918, he wrote, "I don't know the word indicating the difference in degree required to describe the wholly crazy artillery fire which the French turn on for the attack in the morning. The word 'hell' expresses something tender and peaceful compared with what is starting here and now."

In *All Quiet on the Western Front* (Little Brown and Co., New York, 1929, $24.95), Remarque kills off his protagonist's friends as a literary device to emphasize the hopelessness brought on by the war. In Sulzbach's book, it is no device; virtually every one of his friends was killed in action.

LTC Scott Stephenson,
Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE WRONG WAR: Why We Lost in Vietnam by Jeffrey Record. 217 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1998. $27.95.

The United States went to war in Vietnam for the noble purpose of saving South Vietnam from communism. In April 1975 the United States withdrew from South Vietnam as North Vietnamese tanks entered Saigon. The United States had failed in its initial objective of saving the south from a communist takeover. Jeffrey Record explains why it failed in *The Wrong War*.

Record lists reasons for defeat: US policy makers misinterpreted "the significance and nature of the struggle"; policy makers underestimated "the enemy's tenacity and fighting power"; decision makers overestimated "US political stamina and military effectiveness"; South Vietnam was not "politically competitive"; US civilian leaders intruded on "professional military prerogatives"; military strategy was faulty; and so on. There is nothing new here. Many analysts have reached the same conclusions. Only recently with the publication of H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* (HarperCollins, New York, 1997, $27.50) has the bureaucratic infighting and resulting impotence of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff been added to the list of reasons for failure.

The book's strength is Record's compilation of all the reasons for failure into one highly readable book. He finds blame for all involved. He agrees with authors such as Philip Davidson, Andrew Krepinevich and Harry Summers about the failure of the US military to adopt a strategy that would meet the conditions faced. He agrees with Bruce Palmer that the US failed to develop the South Vietnamese military to the point that it could assume the fighting and pacification effort. He also agrees with those who take civilian leaders to task for their unwillingness to divert attention and resources from domestic affairs to bolster the will of the American people by convincing them the war was in the best interests of the United States. As with many other analysts, he castigates President Lyndon B. Johnson for his failure to mobilize the reserves.

The question of whether the United States could have succeeded in Vietnam is one raised by many analysts. Record concludes that the US could have denied a communist victory only by maintaining a more or less permanent presence in South Vietnam. Although this is not the focus of the book, more than two paragraphs on the question would have added a valuable dimension.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, *USA,*
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

MR Letters

Ship Misidentified

The photo caption on page 9 of Colonel David W. Krueger's November-December 1999 article "Obstacles to Maneuver" misidentifies the ship as the USS *Princeton* (CG 59) after striking a mine during Operation *Desert Storm*. The photo actually shows the USS *Stark* (FFG 31) after being struck by an Iraqi missile during the Iran-Iraq tanker war. These are totally different situations that occurred at different times involving different classes of ships. Granted, the *Stark* photo is much more dramatic, but it does not belong with the article.

CDR Richard Payne,
US Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, PA

Editor's note

We regret the error. *MR*